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TO DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE: DUTY OF CANDOR
OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN PATENT
OFFICES
GINA M. BICKNELL*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a small-time inventor in Anytown, U.S.A., who invents a new
widget for his widget factory and soon after files a U.S. patent application.
One day, leafing through the stack of trade magazines on his desk, he reads
an article he thinks is relevant to his invention. He wonders if he should
send the article to the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO).I
He has filed patent applications before, and normally he sends lists of all
relevant references to patent examiners for their review. However, his pat-
ent attorney recently told him something that surprised him-the USPTO
changed its information disclosure rules. Now if applicants submit more
than twenty prior art references, the USPTO will require detailed additional
information for all references submitted. Moreover, any references longer
than twenty-five pages also require additional disclosure, as do any non-
English documents.
This inventor believes the article is highly relevant to his invention,
but truly does not believe it is "material." 2 Normally, he would submit this
reference to the USPTO regardless because he believes it is always better
to be safe than sorry when it comes to information disclosure obligations,
and it is best to let the patent examiner decide if something is material to
patentability. However, he already sent twenty references to the USPTO,
and if he sends this one too then he will have to pay his attorney to review,
analyze, and write relevancy statements for all twenty-one references!
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Ted
Field, Jessica Fender, Jonathan Lahn, and Daniel Stringfield for their careful review and helpful feed-
back. I would also like to thank my colleague, Ira D. Finkelstein, for his legal expertise and insightful
comments. Finally, I wish to thank my husband, Chazz, for his patience and support.
1. The USPTO is a federal agency of the United States within the Department of Commerce. 35
U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
2. To qualify as "material," a reference must meet the criteria set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)
(2006). Relevancy alone does not constitute materiality.
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When he was at a widget convention, his fellow widget manufacturers
told him these relevancy statements rack up huge legal bills. He could try
writing the relevancy statements himself, but he also heard horror stories
from manufacturers who tried this in the past and lost their patents because
they inadvertently mischaracterized the relevancy of the references. Be-
sides, when is he going to find time to analyze references when he has a
factory to run?
A year later, this inventor files a corresponding European patent appli-
cation. He knows that European examiners are usually pretty good at find-
ing references, and he thinks they might find the article that he never
submitted to the USPTO. If this happens, he decides he will submit the
European search report to the USPTO and get the article reviewed "for
free" because no relevancy statements are required when submitting for-
eign search reports. The European search examiner never finds the article,
but the European examiner in charge of substantive examination learns of
the article after seeing it referenced in the background section of one of the
patents included in the search report. The examiner cites the article in an
Office action as the basis for a lack of novelty objection.
The inventor has a corresponding patent application pending in India.
His patent attorney told him that India now requires disclosure of refer-
ences cited by foreign patent offices, even those cited in office actions; he
submits the article identified by the European examiner to the Indian Patent
Office to comply with this obligation. However, he does not submit this
reference to the USPTO because it was not cited in the any search reports,
and therefore he would still have to submit statements of relevancy. Be-
sides, he still does not feel it is material.
Years pass, and the USPTO finally grants his patent. A few months
later, his competitor across the street begins selling identical widgets. The
inventor is furious, and sues for patent infringement. The infringers, how-
ever, wave his U.S., European, and Indian patent file wrappers3 in the air.
Why, they ask, after the European patent examiner found this key refer-
ence, did you disclose the article to the Indian Patent Office, but not to the
USPTO? The inventor's response that he did not believe the article was
"material" seems weak in light of his disclosure to India. The infringers
3. 5B DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 18.05 (2007) ("The 'file wrapper' or 'prosecution history' of a patent
is the record of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) on the application upon which
the patent was issued.... [a]fter a patent issues (or, under some circumstances after an application is
published), the prosecution history (file wrapper) is open to public inspection. It is common practice for
the file wrapper (prosecution history) to be introduced into evidence in an infringement trial. The
practice is an old one.").
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allege that the inventor had a clear intent to deceive the USPTO, and the
Federal Circuit is left to decide whether the accused infringers' defense of
inequitable conduct is strong enough to render the widget patent unen-
forceable.
This nightmarish vision of a new breed of inequitable conduct cases is
not a reality-yet. The USPTO has not codified its proposed new duty of
disclosure requirements.4 However, this hypothetical situation highlights
potential problems U.S. applicants may face in light of the ever-changing
U.S. and foreign duty of candor requirements.
This note discusses U.S. and foreign duty of candor obligations, and
the patent infringement defense of inequitable conduct. Part I provides
background information about the current U.S. duty of candor require-
ments. Part II outlines the USPTO's proposed new disclosure requirements.
Part III reviews the patent infringement defense of inequitable conduct and
examines three Federal Circuit cases that discuss this defense. Part IV pro-
vides an overview of certain foreign duty of candor laws, and considers
their effect on U.S. duty of candor obligations. Part V considers solutions
for improving the U.S. prior art submission and examination processes.
Ultimately, this note concludes that the USPTO's proposed Rules are
overly burdensome to patent applicants, and that other, less onerous solu-
tions exist to remedy the problem of prior art over-disclosure.
I. DUTY OF CANDOR TO THE USPTO
This Part discusses the U.S. duty of candor requirements. 5 Part L.A
provides background information about U.S. patent applicants' duty of
candor to the USPTO. Part I.B explains the materiality standard for prior
art submitted pursuant to the duty of candor. Part I.C describes some prob-
lems U.S. applicants face under the current duty of candor obligations.
4. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71
Fed. Reg. 38808 (proposed July 10, 2006) [hereinafter Rules].
5. See I CHISUM, supra note 3, at GI-7 (defining duty of candor as follows: "An applicant for a
patent is under a duty of candor in connection with the examination of his application. The duty is
violated by either a positive misrepresentation or an omission that is misleading under the circum-
stances, provided that the misrepresentation or omission was material to the question of patentability
and the result of bad faith or gross negligence. The culpable act may relate to (1) an item of prior art
which the applicant knows to be more relevant than that considered by the examiner, (2) existence of a
possible statutory bar, (3) facts on the applicant's own date of invention, or (4) testing and other factual
evidence offered to support patentability. Breach of the duty renders the whole patent unenforceable or
is grounds for striking an application. It may also justify an award of attorneys fees or an antitrust
damage award.").
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A. Background
U.S. patent applicants 6 must act with candor, good faith, and honesty
during patent prosecution with the USPTO. 7 One of the most important
aspects of this duty of candor is that U.S. patent applicants must provide
the USPTO with all material prior art known to them. 8 Prior art includes all
references useful for determining the novelty and non-obviousness of a
patent applicant's claimed subject matter.9 A reference qualifies as prior art
if it is relevant to the applicant's invention and pre-dates it.10 Because a
patent is presumed valid,"I one of the USPTO's most important functions is
to ensure it does not grant a patent on subject matter already known or used
by others.12
Since 1977, U.S. patent applicants have had the affirmative duty of
good faith and candor to disclose information "material to patentability" to
the USPTO. 13 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 ("Rule 56") sets forth disclosure require-
ments, and emphasizes the public policy behind such duty: "A patent by its
very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best
served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time
an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the
teachings of all information material to patentability."'14 Likewise, the pub-
6. The duty of candor and good faith is not limited to just the patent applicants; it extends to
"[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application." 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56(a) (2006). These individuals include inventors, patent attorneys, agents, and any person substan-
tively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2006).
7. "Applicants for patents are required to prosecute patent applications in the PTO with candor,
good faith, and honesty." Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945)).
8. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2006).
9. 1 CHISUM, supra note 3, at GI-18; see also USPTO, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2001.04 (8th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE] (explaining that 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 includes information about potential public
uses, sales, offers to sell, derived knowledge, prior invention by another, and inventorship conflicts).
10. Or more than one year prior to the date of an applicant's patent application for statutory bars. I
CHISUM, supra note 3, at GI-18.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
12. David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation on the Duty of Patent
Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 219-20 (2002)
("[T]he essential purpose of the Patent Office is to uncover what others had known or used before the
applicant conceived of his invention and determine whether the applicant's invention as described in the
claims of his application is patentably distinct from prior inventions.").
13. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977); see also H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005) (amending Chapter 12 of
35 U.S.C. by adding new § 136 entitled "Duty of candor: patents and applications for patent").
14. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2006).
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lic interest is harmed if applicants fail to disclose all prior art references
because unexamined material art can result in undeserved patents.15
B. Materiality
The USPTO requires applicants to disclose information material to the
patentability of each pending claim. 16 The determination of materiality,
however, is part art, part science. In its 1977 Rules, 17 the USPTO created
the "reasonable examiner" standard, under which information is material to
patentability when there is a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable exam-
iner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the applica-
tion to issue as a patent."' 18
In 1992, the USPTO amended Rule 56 to "provide greater clarity and
hopefully minimize the burden of litigation on the question of inequitable
conduct before the Office, while providing the Office with the information
necessary for effective and efficient examination of patent applications."' 9
The following materiality standard now applies to all applications pending
or filed after March 16, 1992:
[lI]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to in-
formation already of record or being made of record in the application,
and (1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information,
15. That is, because "[i]nnovation and technological advancement are best served when an inven-
tor is issued a patent with the scope of protection that is deserved." Duty of Disclosure, Reply to Com-
ment 2, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992).
16. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2006).
17. Prior to 1977, the courts used "objective but for," "subjective but for," and "but it may have"
standards of materiality to determine how a prior art reference affected the patentability of the invention
itself, or the examiner's assessment of patentability. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[3][a] (explain-
ing the three different materiality tests as follows: "[A] finding of fraud is warranted if but for the
misconduct of the patent applicant the patent would not properly have issued. This is what has been
referred to as an 'objective but for test'... .The second 'but for' test is the so-called 'subjective test.'
This test requires a court to examine the effect which fraudulent representations had upon the examiner.
If misrepresentations caused the examiner to issue the patent, then this kind of 'but for fraud' will be
found.... The final 'but for' test has been labeled the 'but it may have' test, i.e., courts look to whether
the misrepresentations made in the course of the patent prosecution may have had an effect on the
examiner.") (citing In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. 1353, 1368-69 (D.
Del. 1975)); see also James Cronin, Inequitable Conduct and the Standard of Materiality: Why the
Federal Circuit Should Use the Reasonable Patent Examiner Standard, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327, 1337
(2006).
18. Patent Cases: Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 5593 (Jan. 28, 1977); see also
Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean
Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 153-54 (2006) (explaining that the Patent Office derived the
"reasonable examiner" definition of materiality from the Supreme Court's interpretation of materiality
in securities fraud).
19. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992). See generally Rene D.
Tegtmeyer, A Refocusing on Inequitable Conduct in New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 191 (1992) (discuss-
ing the impact of the 1992 Rule 56 change).
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a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; 20 or (2) It refutes, or is
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an ar-
gument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an ar-
gument of patentability. 2'
C. Problems with Current Disclosure Requirements
Applicants and their lawyers face three main problems when disclos-
ing information to the USPTO under Rule 56. First, if they disclose a long
list of references they risk being accused of "burying" 22 prior art if they do
not highlight the especially relevant citations: 23
[W]hen an IDS includes several documents of marginal relevance, com-
bined with other evidence suggesting that the marginally relevant infor-
mation was submitted with the intent to obscure material information this
may run afoul of the duty of candor and good faith set forth in § 1.56(a).
In such circumstance, an inference that the applicant or their representa-
tive attempted to cover up or conceal a material reference could be
drawn.24
Second, if applicants write statements of relevancy for certain refer-
ences to avoid allegations of "burying," they may inadvertently mischarac-
terize or misrepresent the relevancy. Third, if they do not disclose relevant
references, they can face charges of inequitable conduct for failing to dis-
close prior art.2 5
20. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2006) ("A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the
information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence,
burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent
with the specification, and before any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an
attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.").
21. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2006). See also 6 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[3][a] (citing Molins
PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (noting that this materiality standard is prospective
only).
22. David Hricik, Where The Bodies Are: Current Exemplars of Inequitable Conduct and How to
Avoid Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287, 301 (2004) ("'Burying' is the submission of a highly
material reference in a long list of less relevant references in the hopes that the examiner will not notice
the material reference.") (quoting Margaret A. Boulware & Tamsen Valoir, Inequitable Conduct, 619
PLI/PAT.1245, 1251 (2000)).
23. Currently applicants are not obligated to submit statements of relevancy for English language
references-37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3) pertains only to non-English language documents. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.98(a) (2006); see also Tegtmeyer, supra note 19, at 206 (recommending that applicants avoid
providing concise explanations for English language references because of litigation concerns).
24. Rules, supra note 4, at 38809 ("[B]urying a particularly material reference in a prior art state-
ment containing a multiplicity of other references can be probative of bad faith.") (quoting Molins, 48
F.3d at 1184); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2004 ("If a long
list is submitted, highlight those documents which have been specifically brought to applicant's atten-
tion and/or are known to be of most significance.").
25. Hricik, supra note 12. at 234 n.1 13 ("In many respects, a lawyer is between a rock and a hard
place. If he does not disclose references, they will later be argued to be more material than those that
were disclosed. If he discloses them in one long list, the accused infringer will contend that he buried
the wheat with the chaff."); see also Tegtmeyer, supra note 19, at 206 (citing the holding in Penn Yan
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The current best practice for U.S. prior art disclosure is to err on the
side of over-disclosure and submit all relevant references to the USPTO, 26
a practice previously encouraged by the USPTO.
If information is not material, there is no duty to disclose the information
to the Office. The Office believes that most applicants will wish to sub-
mit the information, however, even though they may not be required to
do so, to strengthen the patent and avoid the risks of an incorrect judg-
ment on their part on materiality or that it may be held that there was an
intent to deceive the Office. 27
Applicants routinely submit all references to the USPTO because the
examiner, the technology expert, is presumed to have reviewed all refer-
ences disclosed.28 This is a strategically sound move by applicants because
"[i]n reality, an applicant that submits the prior art for evaluation reduces
the universe of prior art that can be used against the applicant later in litiga-
tion. ' '29 If the applicant disclosed a reference, then the presumption is that
the examiner reviewed it, which makes it difficult for accused infringers to
use that same reference against the applicant as a basis for an inequitable
conduct defense.
II. THE USPTO's PROPOSED DUTY OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
This Part discusses the U.S. duty of candor requirements. Part I.A
provides some background information about the USPTO's proposed rule
changes to IDS requirements. Part II.B discuss details of the proposed
Rules. Part II.C discusses how the proposed Rules would affect U.S. patent
Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc. as a warning against burying); Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants
on Fire: Towards A Narrow Construction for Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of
Medical Device and Drug Patent Applications, 72 UMKC L. REV. 669, 715 (2004) ("It is also axio-
matic that in close calls of relevance and materiality, the applicant should err on the side of disclo-
sure.").
26. Robert A. Migliorini, Lessons for Avoiding Inequitable Conduct and Prosecution Laches in
Patent Prosecution and Litigation, 46 IDEA 221, 233 (2006) ("Disclose to the PTO any prior art that is
questionable of being cumulative to information already of record. It is better to play it safe rather than
risk a future charge of not disclosing to the PTO a prior art reference that may not be cumulative.")
(citations omitted).
27. Duty of Disclosure, Reply to Comment 3, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992); see also
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2004 ("[W]hen in doubt, it is desirable
and safest to submit information. Even though the attorney, agent, or applicant doesn't consider it
necessarily material, someone else may see it differently and embarrassing questions can be avoided.").
28. "When a reference was before the examiner, whether through the examiner's search or the
applicant's disclosure, it cannot be deemed to have been withheld from the examiner." Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
29. Upadhye, supra note 25, at 715 ("[D]uring invalidity litigation, the infringer will rarely try to
invalidate the patent based solely on the prior art already before the Examiner because the Examiner, a
presumed expert in the prior art, issued the patent over that art.").
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applicants, and Part II.D describes how the proposed Rules would affect
U.S. patent attorneys and agents.
A. Background
On July 10, 2006 the USPTO proposed new rule changes for informa-
tion disclosure statement (IDS) requirements to "enable the examiner to
focus on the relevant portions of submitted information at the very begin-
ning of the examination process, give higher quality first actions, and
minimize wasted steps. ' '30 These changes, if adopted, will force patent
applicants and practitioners to walk ethical tightropes where the slightest
misstep will cause precipitous falls into allegations of inequitable conduct
and malpractice.
According to the USPTO's "vision" statement, "[t]he USPTO will
lead the way in creating a quality-focused, highly productive, responsive
organization supporting a market-driven intellectual property system for
the 21 st Century."'31 The issue of prior art disclosure is central to this vision
of increased quality and productivity. While applicants' duty of candor to
disclose all prior art should increase U.S. examiners' productivity by help-
ing to identify key references, the USPTO has found that applicants some-
times hamper examiners by providing voluminous references, often of
marginal relevance. 32 The USPTO asserts that this overburdens its small
number of patent examiners33 and leads to long examination delays. 34
Therefore, the USPTO states that the time has come for patent applicants to
help "ease the burden on the Office associated with the examiner's consid-
eration of the information." 35
30. Rules, supra note 4, at 38808.
31. USPTO, Our Business: An Introduction to the USPTO, http://www.USPTO.gov/web/menu/
intro.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
32. Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Requesting More Timely and Useful Information from Patent
Applicants, (July 10, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/com/speeches/06-4 I.htm.
33. There are approximately 3,100 patent examiners for the more than 300,000 patent applications
the Office receives each year. Hricik, supra note 12, at 227 (citing S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intel-
lectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REv. 69, 75-76).
34. See John Doll, Commissioner for Patents, Chicago Town Hall Meeting (Feb. 1, 2006),
slides available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/chicagoslides.ppt
(demonstrating that if patent application submissions continue at the current rate, the pendency for first
Office actions will increase to 46 months for computer task management, 38-47 months for medical
instruments and diagnostic equipment, and Ill months for interactive video distribution).
35. Rules, supra note 4, at 38809.
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B. Overview of Rules
Under the new Rules, U.S. patent applicants must provide
"[a]dditional disclosure," 36 hereinafter referred to as "relevancy state-
ments," for English documents longer than twenty-five pages, 37 and non-
English documents of any length.38 The new Rules also require relevancy
statements if applicants submit more than twenty references in total. 39 This
additional disclosure must "identify information in each document that is
relevant to the claimed invention or supporting specification. '40 Mere
statements by applicants that entire documents are relevant will not comply
with the additional disclosure requirement, and may result in the exam-
iner's refusal to even consider the application unless the "applicant estab-
lishes such fact by sufficient recitation of examples from the document."'41
Moreover, such descriptions must be non-cumulative: "the currently
cited document must include a teaching, showing or feature not provided in
other documents of record, and the non-cumulative description must point
this out."' 4 2 For documents submitted after a first Office action 43 on the
merits, the applicant must "provide a non-cumulative description as well as
an explanation, or copy of a recently issued foreign search or examination
report, for each document submitted after a first Office action on the mer-
its."'44 If an IDS is filed after a Notice of Allowability or Allowance, then
the applicant must meet even higher standards of disclosure.4 5
36. Id. at 38813 (regarding proposed amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3)).
37. Id. (regarding proposed amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3)(i)(B), whereby drawing sheets
and cover sheets count toward the twenty-five page limit, but sequence listings and computer program
listings do not).
38. Id. (regarding proposed amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3)(i)(A)). Note that just because the
abstract may be in English does not make the document an "English language document" for the pur-
poses of this section.
39. Id. (applies to references submitted in one or more IDSs prior to the first Office action on the
merits). Also, documents submitted in reply to a requirement for information, or resulting from a for-
eign search or examination report, do not count toward the twenty-document limit. Id. at 38814.
40. Id. at 38810 (regarding proposed amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3)(iv) requiring "an
identification of at least one portion causing the document to be cited, including a specific feature,
showing, or teaching, and correlation to specific claim language, or where correlation to claim language
is not possible, correlation may be made to a specific portion of the supporting specification"). Id. at
38813.
41. Id. at 38814.
42. Id. at 38810 (defining non-cumulative as a description "that describes a disclosure in the cited
document that is not present in any other document of record.").
43. An Office action is "a letter from a [patent examiner] setting forth the legal status of a [patent]
application." United States Patent and Trademark Office, Glossary, http://www.uspto.gov/main/ glos-
sary/index.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
44. Rules, supra note 4, at 38810.
45. Id.
2008]
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C. How Proposed Rules Affect Applicants
The USPTO believes that the twenty-reference threshold best balances
its interests with those of patent applicants.46 It reviewed a sample of al-
lowed patent applications and found that eighty-five percent of the applica-
tions cited twenty or fewer references, and eighty-one percent of
applications cited fifteen or fewer references. 4 7 If these percentages are
correct, one wonders how the USPTO can be overburdened, when less than
twenty percent of patent applicants submitted more than twenty references?
However, the USPTO skirts this productivity issue, arguing that if less than
twenty percent of applicants are submitting more than twenty documents,
then the new thresholds will not affect most applicants.4 8 Patent applicants
and practitioners, however, question the accuracy of this sampling data and
have requested that the USPTO further analyze the number of references
submitted per technology area.4 9
For reference-rich technical areas, a twenty-document threshold is
significantly burdensome to applicants. 50 Identifying material references
requires time, effort, and expense, and for crowded technical fields there
almost certainly will be more than twenty material references. Summariz-
ing all references following the Patent Office's fact-specific additional
disclosure requirement will be a Herculean task.5 1 The new relevancy
46. Id.
47. Id. at 38809-10 (the sample included 3,084 applications from small entities and 9,469 from
large entities covering a six week period of allowed applications).
48. Id. at 38810 ("It should be noted that a threshold of twenty documents for IDSs submitted
prior to a first Office action on the merits would not require a change in practice for most applications.
The Office expects that more than eighty-five percent of IDSs filed prior to first Office action on the
merits would not require any explanation because the threshold number only applies to IDSs filed prior
to first Office action and has certain exceptions, while the above-mentioned survey included all IDSs
filed throughout the entire prosecution of the application with no exceptions.").
49. The Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO), a U.S. trade association of more than 200
companies and 8,500 individuals, recommended that the USPTO further analyze the number of refer-
ences submitted per art unit. Letter from Marc S. Adler, President, Intellectual Property Owners Asso-
ciation, to Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ipo.org/AM
(select "Law, Policy & Advocacy" hyperlink, then "Board Resolutions and Position Statements"; select
"IPO Position Statements," then "IPO Comments on Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) Require-
ments, 09/27/2006").
50. Id. at A-i. The IPO recognizes the biotechnology and computer fields as especially "crowded
fields" with many prior art patents or scholarly articles. Id.
51. Id. at A-vi ("The actual costs of the rule package are likely to be much greater than suggested
in the rule proposal. The costs appear to reflect the time an Examiner might spend on such an analysis.
Applicant will need to spend more time because: a) An examiner is allowed to be wrong. An applicant
must be 100 percent right. b) As noted in the PTO's public forum in April in New York, examiners
have no liability and face no repercussions for being wrong. On the other hand, if an applicant makes an
incorrect concession in an IDS discussion, the patentee will be bound by that admission. If an applicant
admits too little, the patentee faces charges of inequitable conduct. The IDS discussion that the Office
proposes will require great care, and some IPO members have asserted in may take up to 30 hours per
[Vol 83:1I
TO DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE
statement requirement for documents longer than twenty-five pages is simi-
larly onerous. The length of relevant prior art documents is not within the
applicant's control. Although the USPTO encourages applicants to submit
portions of references in order to stay within the twenty-five page thresh-
old,5 2 this practice will place patentees in the unenviable position of having
to explain why they "selected out" arguably material information if a patent
infringer raises an inequitable conduct defense. 53
The new "additional disclosure" requirement is really the pre-1992
"relevancy statement" on steroids. 54 In 1992, the USPTO took pains to
explain how the elimination of the 1977 statements of relevancy require-
ments would improve the information disclosure process: "[T]he new rules
will actually facilitate the filing of information since the burden of submit-
ting information to the Office has been reduced by eliminating, in most
cases, the requirement for a concise statement of the relevance of each item
of information listed in an information disclosure statement." 55
The current proposed Rules not only reinstate the 1977 relevancy
statements, but also greatly expand the required level of detail. Now, to
justify IDS submissions, applicants must identify a "specific feature, show-
ing, or teaching" that caused them to cite the reference and correlate such
feature, showing, or teaching to specific claim language or support in the
specification.56 Depending on the timing of the disclosure, applicants may
also have to write a "non-cumulative description" about why the reference
is not merely cumulative by explaining what teaching, showing, or feature
reference. If the average application subject to the rule has 30 references, an average response could
take about two months of full time work to prepare, and could reach a cost of $200,000. If the rule is
applied to 10,000 applications per year, the cost could be over one billion dollars. The USPTO states no
basis for its 'Estimated Time Per Response' of' 1.8 minutes to 12 hours' per application.").
52. Rules, supra note 4, at 38813 ("Applicant is permitted to submit only a portion of a document
and is encouraged to do so where that portion can be considered without further context and is the only
portion that is relevant to the claimed invention.").
53. Adler, supra note 49, at A-iv to A-v ("Applicants have no control of the size of the documents
that end up being submitted in an IDS. In particular, patent documents are routinely more than 25 pages
in some technologies. Although applicants are permitted and encouraged by the Office to submit only
portions of documents to avoid submitting documents over 25 pages, such selective submission will
almost certainly result in increased charges of inequitable conduct during subsequent litigation. The
selection of the 'relevant' portions of a document will in many cases be unclear and non-routine.").
54. Before the 1992 amendments, 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 required "a concise explanation of the rele-
vance of each listed item." 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (1984).
55. Duty of Disclosure, Reply to Comment 4, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992); see also
Tegtmeyer, supra note 19, at 196 (commenting that the 1992 change to no longer require explanations
of relevancy for English language documents removed a "tremendous pitfall" for applicants who might
inadvertently mischaracterize prior art, or who might be accused of submitting incomplete statements if
every related feature was not included in the explanation).
56. Rules, supra note 4, at 38810.
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is not provided in other documents of record. 57 The USPTO further warns
that it expects "meaningful compliance" with these requirements, and ap-
plicants must include a "level of specificity commensurate with specifics of
the feature(s), showing(s), or teaching(s) which caused the document to be
cited."'58 This requirement shifts the responsibility of analyzing references
from the USPTO to the applicants and their representatives. Although the
USPTO suggests creating a "safe harbor" for applicants using good faith
efforts to disclose material prior art, 59 the Intellectual Property Owners
Association (IPO) correctly points out that courts would not be bound by
this proposed safe harbor unless enacted by statute.60 The reallocation of
burdens will increase applicants' costs because their attorneys will have to
craft intricate explanations of relevancy, a process certain to be time-
intensive. 61
Finally, applicants risk "giving up" patentable subject matter if they
do not meticulously write their additional disclosure statements for refer-
ences submitted in Information Disclosure Statements. Under the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel, also called file-wrapper estoppel, appli-
cants can "surrender" patentable subject matter in their arguments to the
USPTO during prosecution, and are estopped from later trying to recapture
that same subject matter when enforcing the patent. 62 For example, let's
57. Id. Such "non-cumulative description" is required after a first Office action and after allow-
ance.
58. Id. at 38821 ("These explanations must not be pro forma types of explanations. The non-
cumulative descriptions... of this section must be significantly different so as to point out why the
cited document is not merely cumulative of any other information currently being filed, or previously of
record."); accord USPTO, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INFORMATION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING (2006), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/focus
pp.html (follow "IDS Practice" hyperlink; then follow "Executive Summary" hyperlink).
59. Rules, supra note 4, at 38811-12 (describing proposed § 1.56(0 creating a "safe harbor" for
patent applicants who used good faith efforts in complying with duty of disclosure requirements). Some
take a dim view of this safe harbor:
The Notice indicates at several points that an essential quid pro quo for the entire rule pack-
age is the creation of a "safe harbor" for an individual that states that he or she "acted in good
faith to comply with the disclosure requirements by having a reasonable good faith basis,"
(proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(f)), and that "the Office is honeful that a court in deciding a duty
of disclosure issue will take the proposed safe harbor into account." The Notice identifies no
basis for the USPTO's "hope." It is expected that in a litigation situation, one party will likely
share the USPTO's "hope," while the opposing party is likely to have a different "hope."
Adler, supra note 49, at A-iv.
60. Adler, supra note 49, at 2 ("Although the USPTO suggests creation of a 'safe harbor' for good
faith efforts, this safe harbor would not be binding on the courts absent legislation. IPO believes that a
legislative change needs to precede such a substantive change to current rules.").
61. Id. at A-vi.
62. See Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 883-84 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the patentee
limited his invention in part by arguments made during prosecution to distinguish the primary refer-
ence); Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and Recommended
Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 863 n.131 (1999) ("Prosecution history estoppel, or 'file wrapper
estoppel,' is a defense to infringement by equivalency where the patentee makes statements or admis-
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say our widget manufacturer invented a widget that automatically tightens
screws on an assembly line, and the patent examiner cited two prior art
patents as a basis for lack of novelty-a wrench patent and a pliers patent.
If our widget manufacturer specifically argues in his response to the exam-
iner that his widget invention is completely unlike the wrench and pliers
patents cited against him because it is for automated use, not manual, then
despite the fact that the scope of his claims encompasses any tightening
action, he has expressly disclaimed manual use. If the patent issues, he
cannot later try to argue that his widget is patent protected as a manual
tightening device, even if the widget has this capability: "[P]rosecution
history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining under the doctrine of
equivalents coverage of subject matter it relinquished-whether by
amendment of claims or by arguments made to obtain allowance of
claims--during prosecution of its application." 63 The widget manufacturer
is estopped from asserting a claim scope that contradicts arguments he
made during prosecution.
In this way,. patent prosecution history estoppel is the Miranda warn-
ing of patent law-anything the widget inventor says during his arguments
to the USPTO can and will be held against him.64 The IPO notes this dan-
ger in its Comments on Proposed Changes to IDS Requirements when re-
sions during patent prosecution that limits the scope of a claim. By explaining the relevance of a dis-
closed prior art, the applicant, arguably, is stating what his invention is not."); Upadhye, supra note 25,
at 716; see also Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[E]ven if the claim
limitation has not been amended, an argument-based estoppel may nevertheless arise based on state-
ments made by the applicant during prosecution."); 1 CHISUM, supra note 3, at GI-9 (defining file
wrapper estoppel: "A patent owner may not expand a claim through liberal construction or application
of the doctrine of equivalents so as to recapture subject matter deliberately surrendered by amendment
or argument during the course of the examination proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. The
owner is 'estopped' from adopting a broad construction to establish infringement after urging a narrow
one to obtain the claim in the first place."). See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that examined the principles
of the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel.
63. Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.
Dey, L.P., No. 00-C-1725, 2001 WL 558142, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001); accord Pharmacia &
Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Prosecution history
estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining under the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject
matter that has been relinquished during the prosecution of its patent application. A number of activities
during prosecution may give rise to prosecution history estoppel, including arguments made to obtain
allowance of the claims at issue. For an estoppel to apply, such assertions in favor of patentability must
'envince a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter,' not an 'equivocal' one. To determine
what subject matter has been relinquished, an objective test is applied, inquiring 'whether a competitor
would reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter."') (citations
omitted).
64. Conversation with Ira Finkelstein, Patent Counsel, Baxter Healthcare Corp., in Deerfield, I11.
(2007).
2008)
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
ferring to the proposed § 1.98(a)(3)(iv)(B) correlation requirement: 65 "Cor-
relation of references to claims will constitute an admission on the part of
the applicant, and it will serve as a limiting prosecution history state-
ment."'66 This concern is justified because the proposed Rules only permit
applicants to disclose material references. Therefore, any act of disclosure
has an inherent admission of materiality. "Although the proposal rules re-
tain section 1.97(g), which states that disclosure does not admit materiality,
the requirement that only relevant, non-cumulative art be disclosed appears
to be in direct contradiction to this section." 67
D. How Proposed Rules Affect Patent Attorneys and Agents
The new Rules will compromise patent attorneys. Attorneys must ad-
vocate for their clients, yet the new Rules require them to distinctly point
out each and every correlation of relevancy between the cited references
and their clients' inventions. In doing so, they risk providing arguments to
the examiner that can be used against their clients. The USPTO recognized
this dilemma in the past-in 1992, the USPTO assured patent practitioners
that it was not their role to analyze references:
One comment stated that the proposed § 1.56(b)(1) placed a burden on
the practitioner to analyze references that is inappropriate and contradic-
tory to a practitioner's responsibility to his client .... The rule itself
does not place a burden on the practitioner to analyze references. Infor-
mation can be submitted to the Office in accordance with §§ 1.97 and
1.98, and the examiner will consider the references. 68
Moreover, it is unclear where attorneys' obligations end. In Baxter In-
ternational, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected Baxter's ar-
gument that the importance of one element in a claim was sufficient to
render the entire prior art reference immaterial if it lacked that element.
69
65. See Rules, supra note 4, at 38814 ("Section 1.98(a)(3)(iv)(B) would additionally require a
correlation of the specific feature(s), showing(s), or teaching(s) identified pursuant to
§ 1.98(a)(3)(iv)(A) to specific corresponding claim language, or to a specific portion(s) of the specifica-
tion that provides support for the claimed invention, where the document is cited for that purpose.
Optionally, applicant may indicate any differences between the specific claim language and what is
shown, or taught, in the document.").
66. Adler, supra note 49, at 2.
67. Id.
68. Duty of Disclosure, Comment 26 and Reply, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2026 (Jan. 17, 1992).
69. 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("A difference in a single element, however important to
the patented invention, is not automatically dispositive of the issue of materiality .... References lack-
ing different elements are often combined to reject an application under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Simply be-
cause the [reference] lacked [the element] does not make it likely that a reasonable examiner would
consider the reference unimportant in deciding whether to allow the patent."); see 6 CHISUM, supra note
3, § 19.03[3][b] (discussing Baxter: "the Federal Circuit held that an uncited reference was not cumula-
tive to a cited reference when the former lacked one claim limitation and the latter lacked two claim
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Instead, the Federal Circuit held that "materiality is not analyzed in a vac-
uum. It is not dependent on a single element viewed in isolation. Rather, it
judged based upon the overall degree of similarity between the omitted
reference and the claimed invention in light of the other prior art before the
examiner."' 70 If a reference is not material itself, but could arguably be ma-
terial if combined with other references, is it the patent attorney's responsi-
bility under the proposed Rules to combine these references for the patent
examiner, and then point out the potential materiality? The proposed Rules
provide no guidance for this quandary, but the USPTO's prior assurance
that patent attorneys need not analyze references is surely a thing of the
past.
III. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
This Part discusses the relationship between the USPTO's duty of
candor requirements and the patent infringement defense of inequitable
conduct. Part III.A provides a brief overview of the inequitable conduct
doctrine. Part III.B examines inequitable conduct charges based on mis-
characterization of relevancy and analyzes the LTI case. Part III.C. 1 exam-
ines inequitable conduct charges based on failure to disclose information.
Part III.C.2 analyzes the Molins case as an example of failure to disclose a
reference, and Part III.C.3 analyzes the Dayco case as an example of failure
to disclose a rejection. Part III.D considers the future of the inequitable
conduct defense in view of patent reform legislation.
A. Background
The inequitable conduct doctrine is judicially created.71 It has been
used as a patent infringement defense since 1945,72 and is based on the
limitations. It rejected a patentee's argument that the importance of a particular claim element was
'alone .... sufficient' to make a reference lacking that element non-material.").
70. Baxter, 149 F.3d at 1328 (emphasis added).
71. See Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The
inequitable conduct doctrine, a judicially created doctrine, was borne out of a series of Supreme Court
cases in which the Court refused to enforce patents whereby the patentees had engaged in fraud in order
to procure patents. Although the Supreme Court did not articulate precisely what rendered a patent
unenforceable, the courts generally tended to apply a doctrine somewhat akin to that of common law
fraud, albeit broader. That is, courts required a showing that the information that was misrepresented to
or withheld from the PTO was material and a showing of wrongfulness, such as deceptive intent, wilful
misconduct, or gross negligence. In 1949, the PTO created its first version of Rule 56, prohibiting fraud
before the PTO.") (citations omitted).
72. Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 37 (1993).
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equity principle that "he comes into equity must come with clean hands. '73
This principle "[c]loses the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with
inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief,
however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant. ' 74 If pat-
ent owners wish to enforce their patent rights and sue an infringer, they can
do so only if their own hands are clean. However, spotless hands are not
required: "'equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless
lives' . . . it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud
or deceit as to the controversy in issue."'75 If fraud or deceit is found, then
the accuser becomes the accused, because a successful defense of inequita-
ble conduct will free the alleged infringer from wrongdoing, and the patent
owner will either have one or more patents declared unenforceable, 76 or
will be sanctioned in some other manner.77
If the USPTO adopts the new disclosure Rules, the number of patent
infringement appeals based on the inequitable conduct defense will in-
crease. Because inequitable conduct has often been referred to as a
73. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 814-15 (1945) (quoting Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934)).
76. Applicants may find that if the omitted prior art was material not only to their base patent, but
also to their continuation applications well, then those applications can also be found unenforceable
through the theory of "infectious unenforceability," regardless of the applicants' cancellation or
amendment of the disputed claims. Baxter, 149 F.3d at 1331. However, in Baxter the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's finding of infectious unenforceability because it found the divisional patent
was sufficiently distinct from the parent.
[W]here the claims are subsequently separated from those tainted by inequitable conduct
through a divisional application, and where the issued claims have no relation to the omitted
prior art, the patent issued from the divisional application will not also be unenforceable due
to inequitable conduct committed in the parent application.
Id. at 1332; see also Upadhye, supra note 25, at 675 n.32 (explaining that inequitable conduct does not
affect ownership rights, and therefore does not invalidate a patent, but it can render the patent unen-
forceable against all future defendants). For an interesting discussion about the unenforceability of
patents already withdrawn from a lawsuit, see Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N. V., where the
Federal Circuit found three patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct even though the patent
holder, Bayer, had withdrawn them from the lawsuit after dismissing its infringement claims and filing
a Statement of Non-Liability. No. 2007-1109, 2008 WL 200027, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 25, 2008).
Because Monsanto sought attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 for litigation expenses concerning these
patents, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdiction, stating:
The question facing this court is, thus, whether a district court's jurisdiction under § 285 to
determine whcther there was inequitable conduct in the prosecution of patents that arc other-
wise no longer in suit confers on that court the jurisdiction to hold such patents unenforceable
for inequitable conduct. We hold that it does.
Id.
77. Possible sanctions include: "invalidity, unenforceability, cancellation suit, attorney's fees,
antitrust liability, liability under the Federal Trade Commission Act, liability under securities laws,
recovery of royalties, loss of attorney-client and work product privileges, disciplinary action against
attorneys and agents, RICO liability, and state law tort claims for unfair competition." Cronin, supra
note 17, at 1337.
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"plague" 78 on the Federal Circuit, any increase in such charges might cre-
ate a pandemic. A breach of a patent applicant's duty of candor with the
USPTO constitutes "inequitable conduct" or, in more serious cases,
"fraud."' 79 Therefore, "[n]othing gives greater joy to an accused infringer
than somehow discovering that the prosecuting attorney failed to disclose
material prior art to the examiner." 80 Applicants can breach their duty of
candor by: (1) making affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, (2)
78. Senior Circuit Judge Nichols observed:
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other
reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client's interests adequately,
perhaps. They get anywhere with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but
such charges are not inconsequential on that account. They destroy the respect for one an-
other's integrity, for being fellow members of an honorable profession, that used to make the
bar a valuable help to the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to sustain
the good name of the bar itself. A patent litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an un-
supported charge of "inequitable conduct in the Patent Office" is a negative contribution to
the rightful administration ofjustice.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed Cir. 1988); accord Molins PLC v.
Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[U]njustified accusations of inequitable conduct
are offensive and unprofessional. They have been called a 'plague' on the patent system."); E. 1. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("'Fraud in the
PTO' has been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent
system.") (quoting Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1984)); see also FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("'Inequitable
conduct' is not, or should not be, a magic incantation to be asserted against every patentee. Nor is the
allegation established upon a mere showing that art or information having some degree of materiality
was not disclosed. To be guilty of inequitable conduct, one must have intended to act inequitably.");
Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 732 F.2d 903, 908 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[Inequita-
ble conduct is a] much-abused and too often last-resort allegation.").
79. 6 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 19.03; see also Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141
F.3d 1059, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Inequitable conduct is thus an equitable defense in a patent in-
fringement action and serves as a shield, while a more serious finding of fraud potentially exposes a
patentee to antitrust liability and thus serves as a sword.") (citing Korody-Colyer Corp. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422 (discussing inequitable
conduct: "The charge was formerly known as 'fraud on the Patent Office,' a more perjorative term, but
the change of name does not make the thing itself smell any sweeter."); Migliorini, supra note 26, at
222 (describing difference between inequitable conduct and fraud: "The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ... has expressed a clear preference for the term 'inequitable conduct' to identify a
breach of the duty of candor and good faith to the PTO and distinguishes it from the more severe form
of 'common law fraud,' which can lead to antitrust damages under the Walker Process rationale.")
(citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178-79 (1965)).
80. Hricik, supra note 22, at 299 (further explaining "[t]ypically, the battleground then becomes
whether the withheld prior art was either more material than the disclaimed prior art or whether it was
merely cumulative or more remote than art disclosed to the examiner. If the undisclosed reference was
more material than the disclosed art, then a finding of materiality is likely. The sole issue will be
whether it was withheld with intent to deceive."); see also Harold C. Wegner, Patent Simplification
Sans Patent Fraud, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 211, 214 n.1 1 (1992) ("Injecting the inequitable conduct issue into
patent litigation wreaks havoc in the patentee's camp. The inequitable conduct defense places the
patentee on the defensive, subjects the motives and conduct of the patentee's personnel to intense
scrutiny, and provides an avenue for discovery of attomey-client and work product documents.") (quot-
ing John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based on
Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988)).
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failing to disclose material information, or (3) intentionally submitting false
material information. 81 These categories cast a wide net:
Some of the more common acts of non-disclosure and misrepresentation
by patent applicants that have been found to constitute inequitable con-
duct are failing to disclose prior art, failing to disclose the best mode of
the invention, misrepresenting test data, and failing to report public-use
and on-sale bars to the PTO. 82
The evidentiary standard for inequitable conduct is high. There must
be clear and convincing proof that (1) the prior art is material, (2) the appli-
cant knew it was material, and that (3) the applicant failed to disclose the
material art (or misrepresented such art) with the intent to mislead the
PTO. 83 A simple finding that prior is material, without more, will not estab-
lish inequitable conduct84 because the patent applicant's intent is all-
important, as evidenced by the 1992 Rule 56 amendment replacing "bad
faith or gross negligence" standard with "bad faith or intentional miscon-
duct."'85 However, the more material the omission, the less evidence of bad
faith is required for a finding of inequitable conduct. 86
If the threshold requirements of materiality and intent to deceive are
met, then the court weighs the materiality of the prior art and the appli-
cant's intent 87 to determine if the applicant's conduct was so culpable that
it must find his patents unenforceable. 88
81. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178 (noting that all three of these potential manners of breach must be
accompanied with an intent to deceive); accord Baxter, 149 F.3d at 1327.
82. Migliorini, supra note 26, at 229-30 (also detailing less common acts of inequitable conduct
as follows: "failing to disclose prior art cited in foreign prosecutions, attempting to patent subject matter
invented by another, submitting misleading partial translation of a foreign language document, fabricat-
ing an article praising the invention, corrupting a witness as to prior public-use, committing perjury in
an interference proceeding, not making consistent arguments to the PTO and the courts, filing mislead-
ing affidavits, and disclosing a fictitious mode of the invention."). Id. at 230.
83. Intent does not need to be proven by direct evidence; the facts and circumstances surrounding
the applicant's conduct can infer intent. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180-81.
84. "Materiality does not presume intent, which is a separate and essential component of inequita-
ble conduct." Id. at 1178 (quoting Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1567 (1988)).
85. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2006) ("[N]o patent will be granted on an application in connection with
which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad
faith or intentional misconduct."). See also the Federal Circuit's en bane decision clarifying the intent
standard in Kingsdown Med. Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of
itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence,
including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of
intent to deceive").
86. Baxter, 149 F.3d at 1327 (citing N.V. Akzo v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d
1148, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
87. Molins, 48 F.3dat 1178.
88. Id. ("In light of all the circumstances, an equitable judgment must be made concerning
whether the applicant's conduct is so culpable that the patent should not be enforced.") (citing La-
Bounty Mfg., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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B. Inequitable Conduct Based on Mischaracterization of Relevancy
Mischaracterizing or misrepresenting the relevancy of prior art can
rise to the level of inequitable conduct. Such cases typically occur where
applicants submit untranslated or partially translated foreign references to
the USPTO, 89 or where inventors' affidavits overstate or misstate test data
used to support the novelty requirement.90 However, courts generally avoid
finding inequitable conduct for mischaracterizing the relevancy of English
language references if those references have been disclosed to examiners.
This is because the examiners will have had the opportunity to review the
references and make their own determinations of relevancy.91
In Life Technologies, Inc. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., the Federal
Circuit examined U.S. patent applicants' duty to characterize the relevancy
of prior art references. Life Technologies, Inc. (LTI) engineered an en-
zyme 92 after reviewing a journal article that reported computer compari-
sons of amino acid sequences (the "Article"). The LTI inventors doubted
the accuracy of the Article's results9 3 and conducted their own experi-
89. E.g., Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Com-
bating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155 (2005) ("The inventor, a Semiconductor Energy
employee, submitted a Japanese language version of a material prior art reference in its entirety, but
only a partial, one-page translation that failed to disclose all of the elements of the full-length patent.");
see also Hricik, supra note 22, at 304-05.
90. Hricik, supra note 22, at 306 ("[T]o overcome a rejection based on obviousness, an applicant
may file a section 132 affidavit with evidence, often in the form of test data. Likewise, in order to
antedate a reference, an applicant can file a section 131 affidavit and submit test data."); see also
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2004 ("Care should be taken to see that
inaccurate statements or inaccurate experiments are not introduced into the specification, either inadver-
tently or intentionally. For example, stating that an experiment 'was run' or 'was conducted' when in
fact the experiment was not run or conducted is a misrepresentation of the facts. No results should be
represented as actual results unless they have actually been achieved .... Also, misrepresentations can
occur when experiments which were run or conducted are inaccurately reported in the specification,
e.g., an experiment is changed by leaving out one or more ingredients.").
91. Hricik, supra note 22, at 302 ("The PTO is presumed to have examined [the prior art] and
allowed claims over the art. 'Although misrepresentations about the relevance of a piece of cited prior
art are often asserted to show inequitable conduct, it is difficult to prove materiality or an intent to
deceive where the examiner has the art in front of her and can decide its relevance for herself.' For that
reason, courts continue to reject arguments based on mischaracterization where the reference was
disclosed to and considered by the examiner.") (quoting Boulware & Valoir, supra note 22, at 1251).
92. Life Technologies, Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). LTI
developed a genetically engineered reverse transcriptase enzyme that exhibited DNA polymerase
activity but lacked RNase H activity. Id.
93. Id. The data from the Johnson article was based on computer comparisons, not experimental
data. The data contained comparisons of amino sequences of certain reverse transcriptase enzymes and
the sequence of the E. coli ribonuclease enzyme. The data from the comparisons led the LTI inventors
to consider that the RNase H activity of the RT enzyme resided at the carboxyl terminal end of the
molecule, which went against the conventional wisdom that the RNase H activity was at the front end
of the RT molecule. Id.
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ments. 94 To their surprise, the results matched the Article's findings and the
LTI inventors subsequently created and patented their enzyme. 95 The in-
ventors submitted the Article to the USPTO in accordance with their duty
of disclosure, but never disclosed the key role it played in triggering their
development process.96 When the patent examiner rejected LTI's invention
based on the Article, LTI argued that at the time of its invention there was
no reasonable expectation that the results in the Article could have led to
the development of its enzyme.97 LTI eventually persuaded the patent ex-
aminer that its invention would not have been obvious in view of the Arti-
cle. 98
When LTI later sued Clontech for patent infringement, 99 the district
court found LTI's patents unenforceable on the basis that LTI affirmatively
misrepresented the Article during patent prosecution.l00 The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's holding for several reasons, but perhaps
most importantly for the following: "[T]he inventors merely advocated a
particular interpretation of the teachings of the [Article] and the level of
skill in the art, which the Examiner was free to accept or reject. This argu-
ment did not contain any factual assertions that could give rise to a finding
of misrepresentation."' 0'
94. Id. ("[ln order to 'exclude the possibility' that Johnson was correct, Kotewicz and Gerard
decided to conduct experiments at the carboxyl terminal end of the RT enzyme. Contrary to expecta-
tions, these experiments were successful and, by December 1986, the inventors had created a mutant
RT enzyme that lacked RNase H activity but retained DNA polymerase activity.").
95. Id. LTI's patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 5,244,797 (filed Mar. 18, 1991) and 5,668,005 (filed
Mar. 12, 1996).
96. One basis for the district court's finding of inequitable conduct was that LTI did not disclose
the extent to which the Johnson article influenced them to pursue their invention. Id. at 1325. The
Federal Circuit reversed this finding because it was premised on a misunderstanding of the legal stan-
dards of patentability. Id.
97. Id. at 1323. LTI successfully argued that the Johnson results contravened the understanding at
the time that just deleting the carboxyl terminal end would not be enough to eliminate RNase H activity.
Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation of those in the field that application of the results in
the Johnson article could produce LTI's mutant enzyme.
98. Id.
99. Id. LTI sued Clontech in Dec. 1996 for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,244,797 and
5,668,005.
100. Id. at 1325-26. The district court found that the LTI inventors made affirmative misrepresen-
tations about the Johnson article because they based their argument to the examiner's obviousness
rejection on the premise that the Johnson article provided no reasonable expectation of success, without
disclosing that they did in fact successfully use the Johnson article and it did correctly teach the location
of RNase H activity.
101. Id. at 1326 (citing Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1482 (Fed. Cir.
1986)) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit also noted that the fact that the inventors successfully
used the Johnson article did not contradict their argument that there was no reasonable success in
applying the article because "[r]easonable expectation of success is assessed from the perspective of the
person of ordinary skill in the art." Id.
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While this holding in no way permits applicants to make any misrep-
resentations to the USPTO, material or otherwise, it stands for two impor-
tant principles: (1) patent applicants are allowed to advocate for their patent
positions, and (2) patent examiners are obliged to reach their own conclu-
sions about the relevancy of prior art references. 102
The proposed USPTO Rules blur the distinction between applicants'
and examiners' roles by requiring applicants to self-examine prior art
documents submitted under Rule 56 for relevancy. This blurring may lead
to more allegations of inequitable conduct by affirmative misrepresentation
because applicants, in advocating for their positions, risk misrepresenting
the relevancy of prior art under the proposed heightened disclosure re-
quirement.
Relevancy explanations have always concerned patent applicants be-
cause they can reappear in litigation as direct evidence that applicants in-
tentionally made false or incomplete statements for fraudulent purposes. 103
In 1977, the Patent Office considered comments about its proposed "con-
cise explanation of relevancy" requirement and subsequently modified this
requirement to help applicants avoid accusations of violating the duty of
disclosure. 104 In 1992, the Patent Office went a step further and eliminated
the requirement altogether for documents in English. 105 Under the current
proposed Rules, this statement has not only reappeared, but it has under-
gone a Kafkaesque metamorphosis into an oppressive requirement where
102. See the discussion of Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. in Lisa A. Dolak, As If
You Didn 't Have Enough to Worry About: Current Ethics Issues for Intellectual Property Practitioners,
82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 235, 242 (2000).
[T]he Federal Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that the patentee's mischaracteriza-
tion of a cited prior art reference during prosecution constituted inequitable conduct. In re-
versing the district court's decision, the Court observed that the examiner had access to the
reference at issue, and thus had the opportunity to "place [the applicant's] comments in their
proper context." These decisions illustrate the distinction between misrepresentations that are
per se material because the examiner has no alternative but to rely on them, and mischarac-
terizations that the examiner has the opportunity to detect and evaluate.
Id. (citing Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
103. Tegtmeyer, supra note 19, at 206 ("[T]here is the danger of inadvertent error in providing such
a statement and the danger that it will be asserted in later litigation to be incomplete or inaccurate in
light of a defendant's arguments.").
104. Duty of Disclosure, Comment 70 and Reply, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) ("One com-
ment suggested that proposed § 1.98(a)(3) should be modified to require a concise explanation of 'what
is believed to be' the relevance of information listed to avoid the accusation of violation of duty of
disclosure merely because more relevant portions of the information are later found. Another comment
suggested that the concise explanation should state what is 'reasonably understood by the person sub-
mitting the statement.' Another comment stated that the applicant should be required to explain (1) only
what is understood or believed about the item of information at the time the disclosure is made, or (2)
why the item is listed. Reply: The suggestions in the comments have been substantially adopted in
modifying the language of § 1.98(a)(3).").
105. See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2022 (Jan. 17, 1992) (discussing change to
§ 1.98(a)(3)).
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applicants must distinctly identify relevant sections of cited art and then
explain how the specific feature, showing, or teaching of the cited art corre-
lates with language in one or more of the patent application's claims. 106 If
the examiners rely too heavily on applicants' relevancy statements then
they will undermine the LTI holding-that applicants can advocate for their
positions, and examiners are free to make up their own minds about pat-
entability. The proposed Rules contain no safeguard that applicants can
write these statements in the light most favorable to their positions, or that
examiners must draw their own conclusions. 107
It is difficult to see how applicants can avoid allegations of inequitable
conduct based on the USPTO's "explanation" requirements, which are: (1)
identification, which requires one to identify specific features, showings, or
teachings that cause a document to be cited, and to identify portions of the
document where the specific features, showings, or teachings are found;
and (2) correlation of the features, showings, or teachings to specific claim
language or to portions of the supporting specification. 108
Applicants submitting prior art after the first Office action on the mer-
its face even greater disclosure requirements and must submit the "explana-
tion" described above, as well as a "non-cumulative description," which the
USPTO describes as "[a] description of how each document is not merely
cumulative of any other document, e.g., a description of a specific feature,
showing, or teaching in each cited document that is not found in any other
citation in any (prior or current) IDS, or any information cited by the exam-
iner."109
106. Rules, supra note 4, at 38810.
107. The proposed Rules emphasize examiners' time constraints, and one wonders how thoroughly
any of the references applicants submit will be examined. The proposed Rules state that the document
will first be given "an initial brief review" to see if it requires more in depth study. Id. "This practice
reflects the practical reality of patent examination which affords the examiner a limited amount of time
to conclude all aspects of the examination process." Id. This introduces another "reality"-the danger
that examiners will rely too heavily on applicants relevancy statements without independent considera-
tion.
108. USPTO, CHANGES TO INFORMATION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER
RELATED MATTERS-DETAILED SUMMARY 2 (2006), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/
presentation/focuspp.html (follow the "IDS Practice" hyperlink; then select the "Detailed Summary"
hyperlink).
109. Id. Further, if prior art is submitted after a notice of allowance, then in addition to the "expla-
nation" and "non-cumulative description" applicants must also give a "patentability justification"
stating the reasons why the independent claims are patentable over the reference in view of any infor-
mation on record and an explanation on why amending the claims which otherwise would be unpat-
entable over the reference is patentable in view of any information on record. See Rules, supra note 4, at
38821.
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Compliance with these requirements will be especially onerous for
patent attorneys who must represent their clients zealously,'10 but at the
same time must work against them by pointing out potential arguments for
the patent examiners, as well as identifying the prior art that is material, not
cumulative, for the "non-cumulative description."
If attorneys bill by the hour, they will certainly benefit financially
from their time-intensive review of references and preparation of relevancy
statements. However, the financial gains are not worth the increased risk of
malpractice if they fail to advocate for their clients. Even if attorneys are
able to walk the tightrope between meeting the USPTO's requirements and
advocating for their clients, if they misstate the materiality of a section or
fail to cite a section of the reference that, through hindsight, is more mate-
rial than the sections they cited,"'1 they may face sanctions for miscon-
duct.i 12
Clearly the Patent Office understands the dilemmas applicants and
their representatives will face under the new Rules, because it proposes a
"safe harbor" provision for the "individual who, in good faith and to the
best of the person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after a rea-
sonable inquiry under the circumstances, took reasonable steps to comply
with the additional disclosure requirements." 113 However, there is no legis-
lation enacting this safe harbor provision.1 14 Patent applicants need a safer
safe harbor before they can comply with the new Rules.
C. Inequitable Conduct Based on Failure to Disclose Information
1. Failure to Disclosure a Reference
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., is an inequitable conduct case arising
from failure to disclose a prior art reference. Molins, a tool manufacturer in
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2006) ("A lawyer should pursue a matter on
behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf.").
111. This is almost certain to occur, especially because the USPTO advocates submitting only
portions of references: "Applicant is permitted to submit only a portion of a document and is encour-
aged to do so where that portion can be considered without further context and is the only portion that is
relevant to the claimed invention." Rules, supra note 4, at 38813.
112. See the Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (as passed by House, Sept. 7,
2007).
113. Rules, supra note 4, at 38811.
114. Adler, supra note 49, at 2. This author agrees with the IPO that "a legislative change needs to
precede such a substantive change to current rules." Id.
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the United Kingdom, invented an improved batch machining method in
1965 (the "batch method"). 115 Molins filed patent applications in many
countries, including the United States. Molins later improved its automa-
tion of machining parts, and filed a second family of patents directed to this
improvement ("the System 24"). 116
Molins' in-house patent agent became aware of key piece of prior art,
the "Wagenseil reference," 117 which anticipated the batch method
claims. 1 8 He subsequently abandoned all patent applications for the batch
method, and kept only those patent applications directed to the new System
24 invention alive. However, Molins did not abandon the U.S. patent appli-
cation that contained a combination of both batch method and System 24
claims. 119
Foreign patent offices cited the Wagenseil reference during prosecu-
tion of the System 24 patent applications. However, Molins never disclosed
this reference to the USPTO, nor did it disclose the fact that there were
oppositions to the German System 24 patent application based, in part, on
the Wagenseil reference. 120 Molins abandoned all foreign System 24 appli-
cations. The U.S. patent issued in 1983 as U.S. patent number 4,369,563; as
issued, the patent' 2' only covered the System 24 invention. 122
In 1983, Molins' new patent agent reviewed all the abandoned foreign
System 24 applications and discovered that the Wagenseil reference had
not been disclosed to the USPTO. He filed a prior art statement under 37
C.F.R. § 1.501 ("Rule 501")123 disclosing the Wagenseil reference and
numerous other references cited during foreign prosecution. 124
115. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
116. Id. at 1176.
117. Id. at 1176 n.4. The Wagenseil reference was described by the Federal Circuit as one or more
articles published by William Wagenseil et al. during the relevant time period (1958-1962) that dis-
closed relevant subject matter.
118. Id. at 1177.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1176 n.2. U.S. Patent No. 4,621,410 (filed Sept. 30, 1982) issued on Nov. 11, 1986 was
also directed to the System 24 invention.
122. Id. at 1176 ("Before the patent issued in January of 1983 ... the batch process claims were
cancelled and only claims drawn to the system 24 apparatus issued.").
123. Id, at 1177. See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.501(a) (2006), the Rule that provides for citation of refer-
ences which may be used to support an ex parte reexamination request:
At any time during the period of enforceability of a patent, any person may cite, to the Office
in writing, prior art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person states to be
pertinent and applicable to the patent and believes to have a bearing on the patentability of
any claim of the patent.
124. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1183. The document was eleven pages long, and listed twenty-three U.S.
patents, twenty-seven foreign patents, and forty-four U.S. and foreign printed publications. Neither
translations of foreign patents nor relevancy statements for any prior art accompanied the list.
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In 1984, Cross & Trecker, Inc. 125 filed a request for reexamination of
the '563 patent, based in part on the Wagenseil reference. 126 Molins
pointed out that it voluntarily submitted the Wagenseil reference in 1983.
The examiner reviewed the Wagenseil reference, and did not reject any
claims. 127
In late 1986, Molins sued Textron, Inc., Kearney & Trecker, and Avco
Corp (collectively "Textron") for patent infringement. After three years of
discovery, Textron filed a motion for summary judgment alleging Molins'
patents were unenforceable because of inequitable conduct during patent
prosecution, particularly because of Molins' concealment of the Wagenseil
reference. 128 The district court denied summary judgment, even after Tex-
tron added new allegations of inequitable conduct, but eventually severed
the issue of inequitable conduct. 129 After a bench trial, the court held that
both patents were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.130
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's holding 131
and considered Molins' argument that the patent examiner did not reject
any of its claims during reexamination because the Wagenseil reference
was not material. 132 Using the "reasonable examiner" standard of material-
ity, 133 the court found that the Wagenseil reference was not immaterial
simply because the examiner decided to allow the claims of the Molins
patent application over the reference.134 The court found that certain tech-
nical features described by Wagenseil were particularly material. It also
noted that the foreign patent offices found the Wagenseil reference the
125. Id. at 1177. Cross & Trecker was the parent corporation of defendant Keamey & Trecker.
126. Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.502 (2006) regarding processing of prior art citations during ex parte
reexamination proceedings; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9,
§ 2209 (explaining that at any time during a patent's enforceability, any person can file a request for the
USPTO to conduct a second examination of any claim of the issued patent on the basis of prior art
which that person believes to affect the patentability of the invention. In order for the reexamination
request to be granted there must be a substantial new question of patentability).
127. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1177. Re-Examination Certificate BI 4,369,563 for the '563 patent issued
on May 13, 1986. See generally MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2200 for
details about reexamination of patents.
128. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1177.
129. Id.
130. Id. The district court held Molins' patents unenforceable on November 24, 1992.
131. Id. at 1178. The court used an abuse of discretion standard: "The ultimate determination of
inequitable conduct is committed to the trial judge's discretion and is reviewed by this court under an
abuse of discretion standard." Id. (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
132. Id. at 1179.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1180 ("[T]he fact that the examiner did not rely on Wagenseil to reject the claims under
reexamination or the '410 method claims is not conclusive concerning whether the reference was
material.").
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most relevant prior art reference, 135 although they cautioned that there are
"differences in disclosure requirements, claim practice, form of application,
and standard of patentability"'136 between U.S. and foreign patent offices.
In reviewing the U.S. duty of disclosure requirements, the court cited
the following passage of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP):
Applicants... have a duty to bring to the attention of the Office any ma-
terial prior art or other information cited or brought to their attention in
any related foreign application. The inference that such prior art or other
information is material is especially strong where it is the only prior art
cited or where it has been used in rejecting the claims in the foreign ap-
plication. 137
Based on these considerations, the court upheld the district court's
holding that Wagenseil was material.
Once the materiality threshold question had been met, the court evalu-
ated Molins' intent. Failure to report a reference to the USPTO cited in a
foreign counterpart application can be a simple oversight; therefore, the
courts must have clear and convincing evidence of culpable intent, 138 and
"the alleged conduct must not amount merely to the improper performance
of, or omission of, an act one ought to have performed."' 139 The court care-
fully considered the evidence, including the fact that Molins' first patent
agent was a "seasoned" 140 practitioner who prosecuted the patent family for
135. Id.; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2001.06 (citing
Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)) (discussing Gemveto,
where the patent in question was held invalid or unenforceable because prior art cited by the Dutch
Patent Office was not cited to the USPTO even though it was highly material).
136. Id. (citing Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Commercial Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d
1068, 1072 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
137. Id. (quoting USPTO, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2001.06(a) (4th ed. rev. 8, 1981)). The Court also noted that although the MPEP does not
have the force of law, it is entitled to judicial notice as an "official interpretation of statutes or regula-
tions," so long as it does not conflict with those statutes or regulations. Id. at 1180 n. 10.
138. Id. at 1181 ("[G]iven the ease with which a relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be
portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive, clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to
support an inference of culpable intent is required.") (quoting Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint
Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The court then went on to explain: "[lI]ntent to deceive
should be determined in light of the realities of patent practice, and not as a matter of strict liability
whatever the nature of the action before the PTO." Id. at 1184. (quoting Northern Telecom, 908 F.2d at
939).
139. Id. at 1181 (clarifying that "clear and convincing evidence must prove that an applicant had
the specific intent to accomplish an act that the applicant ought not to have performed, viz., misleading
or deceiving the PTO. In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear and convincing evidence
must show that the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.").
140. Id. ("Whitson, a seasoned patent practitioner, who was aware of the duty to disclose material
information to the PTO, knew of a highly material reference but did not cite it, or any other reference,
to the PTO during the entire 13 years in which he was involved in prosecuting the U.S. patent applica-
tions that led to the '563 patent. During the time the applications were pending, Whitson represented to
foreign patent offices that Wagenseil was the closest prior art. Whitson was on several occasions re-
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thirteen years and never once disclosed the Wagenseil reference to the
USPTO despite his knowledge of its materiality.
The court also evaluated Molins' other actions. It agreed that "[lt]hings
can fall through the floorboards" in patent prosecution.' 4l It also recog-
nized that Molins did eventually (and voluntarily) submit the Wagenseil
reference to the USPTO, albeit after the '563 patent issued, and that the
patent examiner granted the reexamination application after considering
this reference. However, even viewed in the best light, Molins' later actions
could not make up for the fact that "references were not cited when they
should have been." 142 Finding that Molins deliberately withheld a material
reference, the court upheld the district court's judgment. 143 This ruling
highlights the importance of disclosing prior art references cited by foreign
patent offices to the USPTO. Failure to do so initially, even if applicants
later disclose such references, can result in a finding of inequitable conduct.
2. Inequitable Conduct Based on Failure to Disclose a Rejection
Another source of inequitable conduct charges stems from failure to
disclose rejections made by other patent examiners. In Dayco Products,
Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., Dayco filed two patent applications for
mechanisms relating to underground gas containment systems: 144 The first
patent family (the '161 family) claimed priority to U.S. application number
408,161, which was filed on September 15, 1989.145 The second family
(the '196 family) claimed priority to U.S. application number 993,196,
which was filed on December 18, 1992. Despite the technical similarities,
these families were assigned to two different USPTO examiners: David
Arola examined the '161 family, and Eric Nicholson examined the '196
family. 146
While Nicholson knew of the '161 family, 147 Arola was unaware that
the '196 family existed. 148 Nicholson rejected the claims of the '196 family
minded of Wagenseil's materiality through its prominence in the prosecution of several foreign coun-
terpart applications with which Whitson was intimately involved.").
141. Id. at 1182 ("We are mindful of the complexities of conducting a worldwide patent prosecu-
tion in a crowded art, attempting to represent one's client or company properly, and yet fulfill one's
duty to various patent offices. Things can 'fall through the floorboards' and not arise from an intent to
deceive.").
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1361.
147. Id. (stating that there were specific references to the '161 family in the '196 patent applica-
tions).
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under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness. 14 9 Because Arola did not know the
'196 family existed, he likewise was unaware of Nicholson's rejection and
the reference underpinning that rejection.150
The Federal Circuit's analysis of materiality sets this case apart from
other inequitable conduct cases. The court first turned to the MPEP and its
clear guidelines regarding patent applicants' duty to disclose co-pending
applications with similar subject matter and patentably indistinct claims. 15 1
According to the court, references that potentially serve as the basis of a
double patenting rejection both satisfy the pre-1992 "reasonable examiner"
materiality standard 152 and establish a prima facie case of unpatentability
under the post-1992 standard. 153 This holding is hardly surprising-where
a possibility of double patenting exists, an applicant must disclose details
of the co-pending applications. What is surprising is the court's analysis
about rejections from co-pending applications: "We hold that a contrary
decision of another examiner reviewing a substantially similar claim meets
the Akron Polymer 'reasonable examiner' threshold materiality test of 'any
information that a reasonable examiner would substantially likely consider
important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a pat-
ent.' ' 154 The court went on to hold that "the information meets the thresh-
old level of materiality under new Rule 56, in that 'it refutes, or is
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in... asserting an argu-
ment of patentability."'155
According to this expansive view of material information, the adverse
decision of one patent examiner can be material and is subject to disclosure
to a second patent examiner under both the old and new versions of Rule
56. Moreover, failure to disclose such rejections can support a finding of
inequitable conduct. Therefore, simply citing prior art will not satisfy ap-
plicants' duty of disclosure because Dayco expands the scope of material
information beyond prior art.
148. Id. ("[T]here is no evidence that examiner Arola was ever notified of the existence of the
applications in the '196 family.").
149. Id. The examiner determined the invention was unpatentable over U.S. patent number
3,331,981 to Wilson in view of U.S. patent number 5,096,234 to Oetiker, and issued rejections under
§ 103 three times.
150, Id. at 1361-62.
151. Id. at 1365 (citing MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2001.06(b)).
152. Id. (quoting Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 1998)) ("(An] application was highly material to the prosecution of [an application, where] it
could have conceivably served as the basis of a double patenting rejection.").
153. Id. at 1366.
154. Id. at 1368 (quoting Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
155. Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2002)).
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Practically speaking, under Dayco patent applicants and their attor-
neys cannot fulfill their duty of candor by submitting "traditional" refer-
ences such as other patents, journal articles, and product brochures. Now
they must reach into their own prosecution files and submit rejections con-
tained in Office actions from different patent applications if those rejec-
tions refute, or are inconsistent with, their arguments of patentability for
substantially similar claims. 156 This places significant burdens on patent
applicants because tracking prior art cited in other Office actions requires a
sophisticated cross-reference system, and tracking material rejections even
more So.157
D. The Future of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
Patent reform is a hot topic, and proposed legislation has undergone
multiple incarnations recently, including the Patent Reform Act of 2005
and the Patent Reform Act of 2007.158
1. Patent Reform Act of 2005
Although the Patent Reform Act of 2005159 was not enacted, its pro-
posed changes to the doctrine of inequitable conduct are noteworthy. Under
proposed section 136, Congress sought to address the problem of the
156. See Carter J. White, Ira D. Finkelstein & Scott Reese, Expanding the Duty of Disclosure:
Dayco v. TCI, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Mar. 2004, at 36 ("The Dayco court's expansive reading of Rule
56 has a significant effect on compliance with the duty of disclosure. Prior to the ruling in Dayco, most
patent practitioners will have complied with Rule 56 by submitting a 'traditional' IDS. In view of the
decision in Dayco, the duty of disclosure now includes substantive prosecution papers in cases involv-
ing claims that are 'substantially similar' in addition to ainy information that meets the materiality
standard under new Rule 56.") (citations omitted). See also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2001.06, discussing Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., where
the patentee's foreign counsel did not disclose prior art cited by the Dutch Patent Office even though it
was used to reject the same or similar claims, and the patent was held unenforceable. But see ATD
Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Although international search reports may
contain information material to patentability if they contain closer prior art than that which was before
the United States examiner, it is the reference itself, not the information generated in prosecuting for-
eign counterparts, that is material to prosecution in the United States. The details of foreign prosecution
are not an additional category of material information.") (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d
1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
157. Hricik, supra note 22, at 314 ("The practical implication of this rule could be quite onerous.
While practitioners no doubt by now know of their responsibility to disclose related applications to an
examiner, disclosure of pendency is not enough; applicants must now examine office actions in related
applications to see if the examiner has rejected 'substantially similar' claims. The examiner's attention
must be directed to the rejection in a prior office action of 'substantially similar' claims.").
158. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patents Depend on Quality Act of
2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong.
(2007).
159. H.R. 2795.
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"plague" of frivolous inequitable conduct charges by eliminating the use of
this defense by accused patent infringers. 160 Although inequitable conduct
would no longer have been a defense for infringement, it could still have
rendered a patent unenforceable under a separate action, provided that at
least one claim was found invalid due to the Patent Office's reliance on the
patent owner's misconduct. 16 1 However, any misconduct or fraud by an
applicant's attorney would not be attributable to the applicant unless the
patent owner had also violated the duty of candor and good faith. 162
By making inequitable conduct a separate action for unenforceability,
rather than a defense for infringement, there likely would have been a dra-
matic reduction in the number of patents found unenforceable due to ineq-
uitable conduct. The proposed elimination of inequitable conduct as a
defense was generally well received within the intellectual property com-
munity 63, and controversy generally was limited to the proposal that the
USPTO act as the investigator and adjudicator of inequitable conduct alle-
gations. 164
160. Id. The proposed section 136(c)(3), entitled "Limitation on Defenses to Enforcement of Pat-
ent," read as follows:
No defense of invalidity of a patent or other defense to the enforcement of a patent may be
based in whole or in part upon a violation of the duty of candor and good faith under subsec-
tion (a) or on any fraud, inequitable conduct, or other misconduct, except as expressly permit-
ted in this section.
161. See proposed section 136(d), entitled "Unenforceablity Action." Id.
162. See proposed section 136(d)(3)(A), entitled "Liability of Patent Owner." Id.
163. "Because the concerns were that inequitable conduct is overly and improperly used as a
defense, the restriction on its use has been generally supported." James G. McEwen, Is the Cure Worse
Than the Disease? An Overview of the Patent Reform Act of 2005, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 55, 74 (2005) (citations omitted), http://www.jmripl.com/Publications/Vol5/Issuel/mcewen.pdf.
164. See proposed section 136(c), entitled "Adjudication by the Office." H.R. 2795. As one com-
mentator explained:
In another controversial provision, the Patent Reform Act requires that, during litigation, as-
sertions of inequitable conduct be referred to the PTO for resolution. Under proposed
§ 136(c), the PTO is the sole forum for investigating and determining misconduct. There ex-
ists concern over whether the PTO has sufficient funding, making this provision especially
controversial to the extent there is doubt as to whether the agency would be able to implement
the law. However, there remains a belief that some form of the provision is needed in order to
formalize the ability of the PTO to regulate patent practitioners. As such, other than the im-
pact on funding, this provision is not overly controversial.
McEwen, supra note 163, at 74. But the MPEP expressly acknowledges that "[t]he Office is not the best
forum in which to determine whether there was an 'intent to mislead,"' and explains that triers of fact
can witness the demeanor of witnesses who are cross-examined, and that the USPTO is not set up to
handle an adversarial proceeding. Besides, it generally "lack[s] of tools" to deal with inequitable con-
duct. The USPTO also acknowledges that because charges of inequitable conduct are not defined by
statute, they are better handled by the courts instead of an administrative body. MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2010.
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2. The Patent Reform Act of 2007
In a striking departure from the Patent Reform Act of 2005, which
would have abolished the doctrine of inequitable conduct, the Patent Re-
form Act of 2007165 contains provisions to codify it.166 There is strong
opposition from large segments of the IP community against this codifica-
tion of the inequitable conduct defense because it stymies open and direct
communications with the Patent Office, and fosters expensive and unneces-
sary litigation. 167
Both bills also include a mandatory prior art search report and analysis
requirement.168 This requirement is even more onerous than the USPTO's
proposed Rules. Whereas the USPTO's Rules require applicants to submit
relevancy statements for references exceeding twenty-five pages, more than
twenty references in total, or for any foreign language reference, 169 Con-
gress' proposed language requires analyses for all relevant references. 170
Moreover, there is no explanation about what the "search reports" must
contain. Will applicants have to submit database search strategies in addi-
165. The Patent Reform Act of 2007 was introduced in identical bills in the House of Representa-
tives and Senate on April 18, 2007. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). Substitute bills were subsequently introduced in both
the House and Senate. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Sept.
7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Jan. 24, 2008). For the purpose of this discussion, references to Senate Bill 1145 and House Bill 1908
will refer to the substitute bills unless noted otherwise.
166. House Bill 1908 codifies inequitable conduct as a defense for patent infringers who can prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that "a person with a duty of disclosure to the Office, with the intent
to mislead or deceive the patent examiner, misrepresented or failed to disclose material information to
the examiner during examination of the patent." H.R. 1908, § 12. S. 1145 also codifies inequitable
conduct as an infringement defense if a party can prove by clear and convincing evidence that "material
information was misrepresented or omitted from the patent application of such patent with the intention
of deceiving the Office." S. 1145, § 12(a) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. by adding new § 298).
167. For example, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), a trade association having
members from more than a thousand biotechnology companies, academic and research institutions,
strongly opposes codification of the inequitable conduct doctrine. THE STATEMENT OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION ON H.R. 1908, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, at 6
(2007), available at http://www.bio.org/ip/domestic/20070426.pdf ("The threat of such [inequitable
conduct] accusations is chilling communications between patent applicants and examiners, and is
negatively impacting the quality and efficiency of patent examination today. It also is a key driver in the
cost and length of patent litigation, and has been described as a 'plague' by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. BIO believes that this doctrine should be abolished.").
168. See H.R. 1908, § 12(a)(1) (proposing to amend Chapter II of 35 U.S.C. by adding new
section 123, which would compel patent applicants to submit "a search report and other information and
analysis relevant to patentability" or else face abandonment, with an exception provided for microenti-
ties); see also S. 1145, § II (proposing to similarly amend Chapter II of 35 U.S.C. by adding new
section 123, requiring patent applicants to submit "(I) a search report and analysis relevant to pat-
entability; and (2) any other information relevant to patentability that the Director, in his discretion,
determines necessary."). S. 1145 also provides an exception for microentities in section 11.
169. Rules, supra note 4, at 38813 (regarding proposed amendment to 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3)).
170. SeeH.R. 1908,§ 12(a)(1);S. 1145,§ 11.
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tion to results and, if so, could such strategies form the basis for future
inequitable conduct allegations? As dire as this possibility may be, it wors-
ens upon consideration that the materiality standard for such allegations is
still murky, 171 and neither the House nor the Senate included "safe harbor"
provisions to protect patent applicants acting in good faith.
17 1
How the Patent Reform Act of 2007 will ultimately look, if enacted,
remains to be seen. However, if significant changes are not made, this leg-
islation could increase inequitable conduct litigation because the new prior
art search report and analysis requirement, combined with a subjective
materiality standard, would provide ample fodder for infringers without
any safe harbor for patent applicants acting in good faith.
IV. FOREIGN DUTY OF DiSCLOsuRE REQUIREMENTS
This Part discusses the foreign duty of candor requirements. Part IV.A
provides a brief introduction to foreign duty of candor requirements. Part
IV.B examines specific duty of candor obligations for Australia, Canada,
Israel, India, and Japan. Part IV.C analyzes how foreign duty of candor
obligations could affect U.S. applicants now and in the future in view of the
USPTO's proposed new Rules and the Patent Reform Act of 2005.
171. The materiality standard has long been subject to multiple interpretations by the Federal
Circuit. See 6 CHiSUM, supra note 3, § 19.03[3][a]; see also Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach.
Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing five different standards of materiality: the
objective "but for" standard, the "but it may have" standard, the "reasonable examiner" standard, the
old Rule 56 "reasonable examiner" standard, and the new Rule 56 standard). The Federal Circuit did
not feel constrained to follow any one of the five standards:
Even though the PTO's "reasonable examiner" standard became the dominate standard in-
voked by this court, in no way did it supplant or replace the case law precedent. Rather, it
provided an additional test of materiality, albeit a broader and all-encompassing test. Simi-
larly, the PTO's recent adoption of an arguably narrower standard of materiality [new Rule
56] does not supplant or replace our case law. Rather, it merely provides an additional test of
materiality.
Id. at 1316.
Senate Bill 1145 ignores the current USPTO Rule 56 objective standard of materiality and uses its own
"reasonable examiner" standard. See S. 1145, § 12 (proposing to amend Chapter 29 of 35 U.S.C. by
adding new section 298(b), which reads "Information shall be considered material for purposes of
subsection (a) if-(l) a reasonable patent examiner would consider such information important in
deciding whether to allow the patent application; and (2) such information is not cumulative to informa-
tion already of record in the application."). This subjective reasonable examiner standard is especially
problematic when dealing with inequitable conduct allegations because parties alleging inequitable
conduct only need to prove a "threshold level" of materiality to proceed to the "balancing" prong. See
Digital Control, Inc., 437 F.3d at 1316.
172. In its proposed Rules, the USPTO suggested creating a safe harbor for patent applicants who
used good faith efforts to comply with the new duty of disclosure requirements. Rules, supra note 4, at
38811-12 (describing proposed § 1.56(0).
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A. Duty of Candor Obligations to Foreign Patent Offices
Because U.S. patent applicants are limited to twenty "explanation-
free" prior art references under the proposed Rules,173 they may seek ways
to minimize the number of references they disclose to the USPTO. Al-
though failure to disclose prior art cited by foreign patent offices tradition-
ally has not been a large source of inequitable conduct charges,174 patent
applicants cannot overlook this potential pool of prior art in their efforts to
stay within the twenty-reference threshold. Because Molins held that non-
disclosure of foreign patent office citations creates an inference of inten-
tional deception, 175 and Dayco held that patent examiners' rejections of
substantially similar claims are material, 176 U.S. applicants should review
their foreign prosecution files carefully for material prior art and substan-
tive rejections.
Foreign duty of disclosure requirements have changed dramatically
over the past few years, and an increasing number of patent offices require
disclosure of any art cited by all patent offices. As examples of some of the
many foreign duty of disclosure requirements, 177 this note provides an
overview of the disclosure requirements of Australia, Canada, Europe,
India, Israel, and Japan.178
173. Rules, supra note 4, at 38810 "[Fior applications in which twenty or fewer documents have
been cited in one, or more IDS prior to first Office action on the merits, an explanation is required only
for English-language documents over twenty-five pages, and for non-English-language documents of
any length."
174. Migliorini, supra note 26, at 230 ("Examples of less common acts of non-disclosure and
misrepresentation that the federal courts have held to constitute inequitable conduct are failing to dis-
close prior art cited in foreign prosecutions .... ).
175. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Failure to cite to the PTO
a material reference cited elsewhere in the world justifies a strong inference that the withholding was
intentional.").
176. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
177. There are 184 PCT member states. See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO],
Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
178. Australia, Canada, Israel, and Japan are all within the top fifteen countries of origin for the
total number of PCT patent filings in 2006, and India is ranked third of all developing countries. See
WIPO, THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM IN 2006: PCT YEARLY REVIEW 3 tbl.2.2, 4 tbl.2.4 (2006),
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/activity/pct-2006.pdf.
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B. Country-Specific Requirements
1. Australia
Australia amended its duty of disclosure requirements on October 22,
2007.179 The new amendments effectively abolish patent applicants' duty
to disclose documentary searches conducted by or on behalf of foreign
patent offices for corresponding applications. 180 However, the new regula-
tions are not retrospective-if applicants should have disclosed results prior
to October 22, 2007, then they still must provide such results to the Com-
missioner of Patents. 181 Therefore, patent applicants for Australian Innova-
tion Patents 82 or Standard Patents 183 who should have filed foreign search
results before October 22, 2007 must still submit these search results to the
Commissioner of Patents. Unlike the United States' duty of candor, it does
not matter whether the patent applicant considers the prior art search results
179. IP AUSTRALIA, OFFICIAL NOTICE: CHANGES TO REGULATIONS MADE UNDER SECTIONS 27(1),
45(3) AND 1OID OF THE PATENTS ACT 1990, OCT. 18, 2007, http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/resources
/officialnoticesp2007.shtml (scroll down to "Patents Amendment Regulations 2007 (1)" and select
hyperlink).
180. The Abolition of the Duty of Disclosure and Other Issues, FOCUS: PATENTS, DESIGNS AND
TRADE MARKS (Aliens Arthur Robinson, Austl.), Dec. 2007, http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/pdf/pta/fopta
dec07.pdf. The Australian duty of disclosure has a lengthy legislative history. The Australian Patents
Amendment Act of 2001 amended the Patents Act of 1990. Patents Amendment Act, 2001 (Austl.),
available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/comact/1l/6457/pdf/160of2001.pdf; see also Don't Get
Caught Out-Changes to the Duty of Disclosure for Australian Patents and Applications, FOCUS:
PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS (Aliens Arthur Robinson, Austl.), Aug. 2003,
http://www.aar.com.au/pubspta/pta/fopdtaug03.htm. The Amendment included a new duty of disclosure
provision requiring applicants to provide the Australian Patent Office with all patent and non-patent
documents known to the applicant, including private patentability searches. See Patents Amendment
Act 2001, § 14, sched. I (amending subsection 45(3) of the Patents Act 1990). This Act was amended
in 2003 to limit the disclosure requirement to any documentary searches conducted by or on behalf of
foreign patent offices for corresponding applications. Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act,
2003, § 2, sched. 2, available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/comact/Il/6653/pdf/0482003.pdf
(repealing subsection 45(3) of the Patents Act 1990)
181. IP AUSTRALIA, supra note 179, at 1 ("[]f the final date by which an applicant or patentee was
required to inform the Commissioner of the results of a search under the regulations was before 22
October 2007, and the Commissioner was not informed of the results of the search by that final date, the
results of that search remains [sic] outstanding. The amending legislation does not excuse any past
failure to comply with the disclosure obligations.").
182. An Innovation Patent is an inexpensive, fast-track patent for inventions that do not meet the
threshold level of inventiveness required for Standard Patents. Innovation Patents only last a maximum
of eight years. See generally IP AUSTRALIA, THE INNOVATION PATENT, http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/
patents/what..innovation.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
183. The Standard Patent correlates more closely to the U.S. utility patent, and protects an inven-
tion for up to twenty years. See IP AUSTRALIA, WHAT IS A PATENT, http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/
patents/what index.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
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material to the examination of the application. All results 84 from patent
office searches, regardless of relevance, must be disclosed.185
Applicants must submit search results within six months after request-
ing examination, 186 or within six months after the date that the foreign pat-
ent office completed the search, whichever is later. 187 Extensions of time
can be obtained up to three months after the publication of the notice of
acceptance for a fee. 188 If applicants do not disclose the required search
results to the Commissioner of Patents, then they lose their right to amend
claims after the patent's issuance.189
2. Canada
The Canadian Patent Rules require patent applicants to provide details
of any prior art identified by foreign patent offices during prosecution of
corresponding patent applications.1 90 Applicants may voluntarily submit
these results when requesting examination, or they may wait for the Patent
Office's formal request. 191 Upon the Examiner's request, applicants have
six months to comply with the disclosure requirement, and failure to do so
may lead to the application's abandonment. 192
184. But copies of references are not required. Id.
185. Don 't Get Caught Out-Changes to the Duty of Disclosure for Australian Patents and Appli-
cations, supra note 180 ("The Australian provisions require the disclosure of all results of patent office
searches, irrespective of the relevance of the results to the patentability of the invention disclosed in the
application."). Also, the categorization symbol for references, e.g. X, Y, or A, should be included,
particularly for the E.P.O. and U.K. Patent Offices.
186. But note that there are no disclosure requirements for applicants requesting modified examina-
tion, a fast-track examination process for applicants with a patent application for the same invention in
U.S., Canada, New Zealand or a country that is signatory of the EPC. See IP AUSTRALIA, MODIFIED
EXAMINATION (2005), http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patents/specific/modified.pdf.
187. Applicants for Innovation Patents have a shorter three-month time frame. See IP AUSTRALIA,
supra note 179.
188. Id.
189. Patents Amendment Act 2001, § 22, sched. 1, available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html
/comact/1 1/6457/pdf/160of2001 .pdf (inserting new subsection 102(2C) into the Patents Act 1990).
190. Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, § 29 (Can.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cr/
SOR-96-423.
191. If patent applicants wait for the examiner's request, then in addition to prior art they may also
have to provide details of conflict, opposition, reexamination or similar proceedings and a translation of
all prior art not in English or French. CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE
PRACTICE § 13.04 (1998), http://www.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/mopop-e.pdf.
192. Patent Act, R.S., ch. P 4, § 73(l)(a) (1985), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/
cs/P-4///en.
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3. Europe
The European Patent Convention governs patent practice before the
European Patent Office (EPO). 193 The Convention contains no duty of
candor requirements for patent applicants seeking European patents; patent
examiners alone must find all prior art during prosecution.194
The EPO has a bifurcated patent system with separate Search and Ex-
amining Divisions, each having its own examiners. 195 The Search Examin-
ers must search all in-house or external collections of documents and
databases to discover the state of the art relevant to the novelty and inven-
tive step aspects of the invention in question, as well as provide a written
opinion about whether the application meets the EPC requirements. 196 The
examiner for the Examining Divisions reviews the Search Examiner's find-
ings, conducts the substantive examination of the application, and makes
the final decision of patentability for the invention. 197
Although no prior art is required from patent applicants, members of
the public have the opportunity to submit relevant art while the application
is pending and during the nine-month opposition period following a pat-
ent's issuance. 198
193. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Nov. 29, 2000 (entered into force Dec. 13,
2007), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html (select "Download PDF Ver-
sion"). This is the updated version of the previous Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5,
1973, 13 l.L.M. 270 (1974). See also the list of members of the contracting states to the EPC, at Euro-
pean Patent Office, Member States of the European Patent Organisation, http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/members.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
194. Noel J. Akers & David P. Owen, Skeletons in the Closet: No Duty of Candor in Europe Can
Cause Problems in the U.S., PATENT STRATEGY & MGMT., Jan. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.
howrey.com/practices/ip/index.cfm?contentlD=261 ("[T]he European system places the burden of
finding relevant prior art squarely on the shoulders of the patent office. An applicant for a patent in
Europe may choose to remain completely silent about prior art it is aware of, no matter how relevant.").
The authors go on to explain that although not required, many applicants choose to voluntarily provide
prior art to reduce the chance of successful oppositions. Id.
195. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE pt.B ch.l-l, pt.E ch.XII-2 (2007), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-
texts/guidelines.html (go to "Download Complete Guidelines").
196. Id. atpt.B,ch.II-1.
197. Id. at pt.C, ch.VI.
198. See Article 115, entitled "Observations of Third Parties" of the Convention on the Grant of
European Patents, supra note 193 (explaining that members of the public can submit their observations
of the invention's patentability after the patent application has published). See also EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, supra note 195, at pt.D, ch.lll-I (explaining that a notice of opposition must be given to the
EPO within nine months from the publication of the mention of the grant of the European patent).
Examples of grounds for opposition include: the subject matter is not new or involve an inventive step;
it is not susceptible of industrial application; the patent does not disclose the invention sufficiently
enough for one to practice it. The subject matter of the patent overreaches that disclosed in the applica-
tion. Id.
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4. India
Under amended §§ 8(1) and 8(2) of the Indian Patents Act, 199 appli-
cants for Indian patents must file a statement listing the details of all corre-
sponding applications. 200 Applicants must continue to provide these details
to the Indian Patent Office within six months of filing any corresponding
applications.201 Applicants must also submit search results from foreign
patent offices within six months from receipt of the Controller's request;
extensions of time are available upon petition and payment of fee. The
Controller can also request the following information from applicants: (1)
objections by foreign patent offices regarding novelty or patentability, and
(2) amendments made to specification or claims during foreign patent
prosecution.202
5. Israel
On August 10, 1995, the Israeli Parliament amended Israel's Patents
Law. 203
Section 18 of the Patents Law allows the Israeli Patent Office to re-
quire patent applicants to provide detailed prior art at all times during the
patent prosecution process (and during oppositions, if applicable). 204 The
required prior art includes a listing of references cited by, or provided to,
foreign patent offices for corresponding patents or patent applications. 205
199. The primary statute for Indian patent law is The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/pdf/en/in/inOO4en.pdf. The Act has been amended five times, the
most recent being The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, 18 Gazette of India: Extraordinary,
pt.2, § 1, at 1 (2005), available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent-2005.pdf. In addition to the
Patent Act, there are also Patent Rules. For an excellent summary on The Patents Act 1970, and Indian
patent practice generally, see MANOJ PILLAI ET AL., PATENT PROCUREMENT IN INDIA (2007),
www.ipoef.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Programs&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Contentl
D=15238.
200. The statement must include the country names, serial numbers, and dates of filing. See Law
No. 39 of 1970, § 8(l)(a).
201. See id. § 8(a)(b); see also The Patent (Amendment) Rules, 2006, 455 Gazette of India: Ex-
traordinary, pt.2, § 3(ii), at 6 (2006), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent-rules_ 2006.pdf
(amending rule 12 of The Patent Rules, 2003, so that the time period has been extended from three
months to six months).
202. See Law No. 39 of 1970, § 8(2).
203. Patents Law, 1967, Sefer HaHukim (S.H.) 148, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_
new/pdf/en/il/ilOO I en.pdf. The Patents Law was amended by Amendment No. 2 in 1995. For more
information about Amendment No. 2, see Michael Cohn, Israel: Amendment of the Israeli Patents Act,
http://www.rctm.co.il/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0-A/7-0-9F (follow "Publications" hyperlink, then "Arti-
cles" hyperlink, then select "Israel: Amendment of the Israeli Patents Act") (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
204. S.H. 148, § 18A; Cohn, supra note 203, § 5.
205. S.H. 148, § 18(a)(l). Regarding oppositions, see Cohn, supra note 203 (commenting on
several decisions where the Registrar ruled that applicants' duty to disclose extended to opposition
proceedings).
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The Israeli Patent Office can also require applicants to provide any relevant
prior art known to them, regardless of whether such art was cited by or to
other patent offices.206 Because of these broad disclosure categorizations,
applicants should provide at least the following information: (1) patent and
non-patent references cited during prosecution of corresponding foreign
applications, including Search Reports, Notice of References Cited, Office
actions, IDSs; and (2) patent and non-patent references cited during opposi-
tion proceedings. The Patent Office may also require applicant to provide
copies of all prior art.2 07
The Patent Office can impose strict sanctions for non-compliance or
willful deception of § 18 requirements, including invalidation of patent
rights. Section 18C permits the court or Registry to: (1) revoke the patent
or not grant the patent, (2) grant a compulsory license under the patent to
anyone who requests such license, or (3) order a shortened patent term. 208
Additionally, under Israeli penal law, the court can fine anyone "who de-
livered the misleading particular or who knowingly did not keep the Office
up-to-date on the list of publications and documents. '209
6. Japan
On September 1, 2002, § 36(4) of the Japanese Patent Law was
amended to reflect new duty of disclosure requirements for national and
international patent applications filed after the amendment date. 210
The Japanese Patent Office (JPO) allows applicants to include prior
art citations in the patent specification at the time of filing.211 Applicants
are allowed to amend the specification at a later date to add citations with-
out the amendments being considered new matter.2 12
206. S.H. 148, § 18(a)(2); see also Cohn, supra note 203.
207. S.H. 148, § 18(a)(3).
208. Id. § 18C(1).
209. Id. § 18C(2).
210. See EXAMINATION STANDARDS OFFICE, JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES
ON REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON PRIOR ART DOCUMENTS (2002)
http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki-e/t tokkyo e/pdf/prior art doc.pdf; see also EXAMINATION STANDARDS
OFFICE, JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, PUBLICATION OF THE "EXAMINATION GUIDELINES ON REQUIREMENT
FOR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON PRIOR ART DOCUMENTS" (2002), http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki
e/index.htm (Scroll down to "Publication of the 'Examination Guidelines on Requirement for Disclo-
sure of Information on Prior Art Documents' 30.8.2002" and select hyperlink). The new requirements
do not affect international applications filed before September 1, 2002 that enter the Japanese national
phase after that date, or pending Japanese applications that entered the Japanese national phase before
September 1, 2002. See Shusaku Yamamoto, I.P. JAPAN, Fall/Winter 2002-2003, at 3 (Japan), available
at http://www.shupat.gr.jp/library/ipjapan/index.html (select "Fall/Vinter 2002/03").
211. Shusaku Yamamoto, supra note 210, at 4.
212. Id,
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The JPO can issue Office actions requiring disclosure of prior art
documents. Applicants may either amend the specification to include the
references, or may argue that they are unaware of any prior art docu-
ments. 213 However, there is no ongoing duty to submit prior art documents
to the JPO.214
Failure to comply with disclosure requirements may result in the JPO
issuing an Office action; the applicant will then have the chance to respond.
Failure to respond may be grounds for refusal, but non-compliance will not
invalidate the patent and will not provide grounds for opposition.215
C. How Foreign Duty of Disclosure Requirements Affect U.S. Patent
Practice
Following Molins and Dayco, material references cited in foreign ap-
plications must be provided to the USPTO, and rejections from foreign
examiners may also be material and subject to disclosure. 216 In addition to
these disclosure obligations, however, U.S. applicants must also consider
how their compliance with foreign disclosure laws may affect the enforce-
ability of their U.S. patents if the USPTO's proposed Rules are adopted.
At a minimum, applicants must cross-cite material information result-
ing from corresponding foreign applications and disclose the same to the
USPTO;217 they should never withhold material information from any pat-
ent office. However, U.S. patent applicants must make a series of addi-
tional disclosure decisions if the USPTO's proposed Rules or the Patent
Reform Act of 2007 are passed. If the Rules and The Patent Reform Act of
2007, as drafted, are passed, then in order to avoid inequitable conduct
allegations prudent applicants will submit both material and relevant
documents for the examiner's review. However, there will be significant
costs to applicants for such over-disclosure because of the new relevancy
statement requirements for references more than twenty-five pages long,
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Although Dayco discusses rejections made by other U.S. patent examiners, there is no reason
to think that rejections from foreign patent examiners are immune if they relate to substantially similar
claims. See White, supra note 156 ("If a foreign examiner takes a position that contradicts your implied
assertion of patentability of substantially similar claims, it logically follows from the Dayco holding
that these documents themselves are subject to the duty of disclosure.").
217. White, supra note 156 (recommending cross-checking foreign prosecution: "Check for and
cross-cite material information resulting from foreign counterpart applications. This includes not only
the references cited, but also the actual Search Reports, Written Opinions, Examination Reports and
Office Actions issued by foreign patent offices.").
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foreign documents of any length, or submissions totaling more than twenty
references.
To minimize costs, it is possible that applicants may try to stay within
the disclosure limits by the following practices: 218 First, applicants may
cull all references that are cumulative or only marginally relevant. Submit-
ting cumulative or marginally relevant references was ill-advised under the
previous Rules because it could lead to an inference of burying, and is il-
logical under the current Rules where applicants must write relevancy
statements for references exceeding the twenty-document threshold.219
Second, applicants may list relevant but clearly non-material references in
the patent specification. Although the examiner does not have to consider
references listed in specifications, at least including references in the speci-
fication gets them in the patent record. 220 Further, if a foreign examiner
reads the references included in a specification and cites them in a foreign
search report, then the applicant can submit the search report to the USPTO
for "free" (no additional disclosure necessary). 221 Third, applicants may
wish to discuss background references in their responses to Office actions.
Again, this will get the references on record, but the examiner need not
consider the reference. 222 Finally, applicants may consider filing an inter-
national PCT application first. The international search report will contain
the first cut of references. Therefore, there will be fewer references to add
to the twenty-document threshold under the new USPTO Rules.
A major public interest concern under this scenario is that the quality
of patent applications may decrease. Because the duty of candor attaches to
applicants' knowledge of material art, it is not advantageous for applicants
to understand the state of the art. If the Rules are codified, but not the Pat-
ent Reform Act of 2007, then private patentability searches may de-
218. This discussion is limited to a theoretical discussion of what may occur, and is not a recom-
mendation of any of these practices.
219. Rules, supra note 4, at 38808.
220. Id. at 38813 (explaining that documents not included in the IDS but mentioned in the specifi-
cation would not be counted toward the twenty document threshold number, but that also the examiner
has no obligation to review such references); see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,
supra note 9, § 60911IC(I), regarding non-complying IDSs. However, this author wonders what effect
references will have if they are in the record, but not considered by the examiner-presumably this
would not suffice to avoid inequitable conduct allegations.
221. "For IDSs submitted in the first time period, applicant may submit documents resulting from a
foreign search or examination report where a copy of the report is submitted ... without triggering any
additional disclosure requirements." Rules, supra note 4, at 38814.
222. Id. ("In the isolated situation where applicant wishes to identify a purely background docu-
ment after a first Office action on the merits, the document can be discussed as part of the Re-
marks/Arguments section of a reply to the Office action.").
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crease.223 Because applicants would have no affirmative duty to undertake
prior art searches, either currently or under the proposed Rules, a head-in-
the-sand approach is more cost-effective. 224 As the IPO points out in their
Comments, the Proposed Rules in effect penalize large corporations for
undertaking preliminary patentability searches because they place extra
burdens on the applicants if the applicants identify more than twenty mate-
rial documents.225 It is illogical to penalize patent applicants in this man-
ner. Patentability searches unearth the most relevant references, which
applicants then disclose to the USPTO. This makes the USPTO's internal
search and examination process more efficient, and results in higher quality
patents for the public good.
If the Patent Reform Act of 2007 is enacted with the proposed search
report and analysis requirements, then applicants will still conduct searches
but their value may decrease. If applicants know that their search reports
will be part of the public record, and subject to inequitable conduct allega-
tions, then they may conduct more limited searches. They may also wish to
minimize the fees they pay to professional searchers and patent attorneys.
This would contravene the entire purpose of patentability searches, and
potentially negatively impact the quality of patent applications and granted
patents.
223. "May" is used here because it is unknown whether applicants will go through the effort and
expense of filing a patent application without first learning whether similar inventions already exist.
However, private patentability searches can cost more than the initial filing fees, and applicants, espe-
cially smaller applicants, may want the USPTO do the prior art search because they save money on
search costs and IDS filing costs.
224. Letter from Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Chair, American Bar Association Section of Intellec-
tual Property Law, to John Doll, Commissioner for Patents, at 4 (Sept. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab95/ids.htm (follow "American Bar
Association Section of Intellectual Property Law" under "Intellectual Property Organizations and
Government Agencies") ("Naive Applications will face little burden because they will have no refer-
ences to cite. Thus, the burden will fall disproportionately on the knowledgeable Applicant. Moreover,
this may serve as a further disincentive to search in the first place, certainly not the outcome the Office
would desire."). The MPEP makes a special point of emphasizing the duty to disclose "all material
[individuals covered by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56] are aware of regardless of the source of or how they become
aware of the information," MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 9, § 2001.06. But
see Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 188 F. App'x 984, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Although as a general
rule a party has no affirmative duty to search for relevant prior art... 'one should not be able to culti-
vate ignorance, or disregard numerous warnings that material information or prior art may exist, merely
to avoid actual knowledge of that information or prior art."') (citing FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
225. Adler, supra note 49, at A-i ("The proposed rules... make it extraordinarily difficult for
applicants to meet their duties. The problems are especially acute for [] patent applications for which a
preliminary patentability search has been conducted, as is often the case with larger corporations (thus
penalizing such corporations for likely making the examination process more efficient by pre-locating
many of the most relevant references).").
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
This Part proposes three possible solutions for improving the U.S. IDS
submission and examination process. These solutions include: (1) adopting
the European model of search and examination procedures, (2) fining ap-
plicants for frivolous IDS submissions, and (3) adopting a peer-review
system of prior art examination.
A. Adopt European Model
No patent system is perfect, but patent applicants generally view the
European Patent Office as giving high quality search reports.226 European
examiners find material prior art despite there being no duty of disclosure
obligation.
The reasons for the European system's success in this regard would
require detailed analysis. However, certain differences are apparent.22 7
Patent examination in Europe is split between two examiners, whereas in
the U.S. one examiner performs both aspects of examination. 228 Although
this may change at some point, 229 the current splitting of searching and
substantive examination seems to allow examiners more time to focus on
their respective duties. Also, European patent examiners are well compen-
sated and tend to be "career employees. ' 2 30
One of the clearest messages from the USPTO is that it is over-
whelmed by applicants submitting cumulative or immaterial patent refer-
ences. If so, one simple solution, again following the European model,
would be to eliminate the duty of candor requirement altogether. Instead of
226. Wegner, supra note 80, at 222 ("There is no more helpful single document for the most impor-
tant cases than the European Search Report.").
227. One compelling difference may be as simple as attitude. The EPO's Guidelines for Examina-
tion remind the examiners that: "The attitude of the examiner is very important. He should always try to
be constructive and helpful. While it would of course be quite wrong for an examiner to overlook any
major deficiency in an application, he should have a sense of proportion and not pursue unimportant
objections." EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 184, pt.C, ch.l, § 2.
228. Wegner, supra note 80, at 223 n.35 (explaining that European examiners' workload is far less
than their American counterparts, stating "[tihe number of searches conducted by the Hague Examiner
is roughly of the same order of magnitude as the disposals for an American Examiner, who for each
disposal must both search and completely examine a patent application.").
229. Regarding the European Bringing Examination and Search Together (BEST) project for a
unified search and examination process, see John A. Jeffery, Comment, Preserving the Presumption of
Patent Validity: An Alternative to Outsourcing the U.S. Patent Examiner's Prior Art Search, 52 CATH.
U. L. REv. 761, 774 (2003).
230. Wegner, supra note 80, at 222. ("The European Search Report is prepared by an elite diplo-
matic corps of international examiners headquartered in The Hague. The great status of the position of
such an examiner coupled with salary and prerequisites leads to career employees, as opposed to the
frequent turnover in the United States. The European search examiners are each multilingual and spe-
cialize in searching patent applications.").
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being swamped with references, examiners could conduct searches them-
selves and immediately focus on the references they consider material to
patentability. This would also eliminate inequitable conduct allegations of
burying, mischaracterizing references, 231 or failing to disclose.
The concern, of course, is that examiners might miss a key piece of
prior art that only the applicant knows of. However, if the applicant knows
of the reference, it is logical that his key competitors also are aware of the
reference. 232 If a European-style opposition system were adopted as pro-
posed by the Patent Reform Act of 2005, then there would be a mechanism
for third parties to oppose newly issued patents on the grounds that key
references were not considered during prosecution. 233 This safeguard might
be all that is needed to ensure that the right prior art is considered by patent
examiners.
B. Pay Higher Fees or Impose Sanctions
Perhaps the USPTO is correct that "We can not hire our way oUt!!! ' ' 234
However, common sense suggests that offering better salaries and working
conditions would help improve the historically poor retention rate of U.S.
examiners. 235 Higher fees can be charged to applicants who submit more
then twenty references, and these fees can be used to increase examiners'
salaries or to redesign the USPTO's internal examination process, ideally to
provide the examiners with more time to review prior art references. 236
231. Unless such mischaracterization occurs during prosecution, for example, as in a response to
an Office action.
232. However, this is not the case if the reference is a "public use" under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) that
no one but the applicant knows of, or likewise a printed publication that no one has read; For a recent
decision about a failure to disclose a sale rising to the level of inequitable conduct, see generally Dip-
pin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
233. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 89, at 156 ("Because the United States does not have a formal
opposition proceeding during which an applicant's competitors may submit relevant prior art before a
patent issues, the PTO depends upon examiners and applicants to cover the full scope of the prior art.").
For details about post-grant oppositions in proposed new chapter 32, see Patent Reform Act of 2005,
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005).
234. Doll, supra note 34.
235. In FY 2004, 443 patent examiners were hired, and 336 left. In FY 2005, 959 patent examiners
were hired, and 425 left. Doll, supra note 34.
236. See Adler, supra note 49, at A-i ("The Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) process has
been a well integrated, procedurally-balanced system. An imbalance in the system is that the USPTO
has under-priced the fee that [is] charged for reviewing prior art submitted after examination. That fee
should probably increase from $180, where it has been for almost fifteen years. The additional funds
generated by this change could be used by the USPTO to provide the examining corps additional time
to review applications with atypically large numbers of submitted references and/or large numbers of
pages in such submitted references.").
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Moreover, perhaps all that is necessary to dissuade applicants from
submitting cumulative references is a surcharge for excess references. 3M
suggested this in its comments about the proposed Rule changes:
Applicants would be entitled to a review of twenty references with the
basic filing fee, but would be required to pay a surcharge commensurate
with the added burden on the PTO for examination of additional refer-
ences. Alternatively, if the PTO implements the characterization re-
quirement, applicants would have the option to pay the surcharge rather
than characterize the references. 237
While it is easy for applicants to take the "better safe than sorry" ap-
proach and submit everything known under the sun, if extra fees are in-
volved it is likely this laissez-faire attitude would change.
Another alternative would be to fine applicants or attorneys who waste
examiners' time by submitting clearly non-relevant art. If the fines do not
stop repeat offenders, perhaps suspension of patent attorneys or agents
from practicing in front of the USPTO would be appropriate if their large
IDS submissions reach the stage of frivolousness. 238
C. Peer-Review System
Finally, one of the most innovative approaches to patent reform is an
open source project for the collaborative peer review of prior art-the Peer
to Patent Project.239 This project, the brainchild of a New York Law School
professor24° and now a formal initiative led by the New York Law School
and the USPTO,241 recognizes that examiners are overburdened in part
237. Letter from Spielbauer et al., 3M Innovative Properties Co., to Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO (Sept. 8, 2006) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab95/ids.htm (follow "3M Innovative
Properties Company" hyperlink under "Corporations and Associations"); see also Adler, supra note 49,
at A-vii.
238. A rule similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be appropriate.
239. The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent Review, http://dotank.nyls.edu/community
patent (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
240. Nicholas Varchaver, Patent Review Goes Wiki, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 18 ("New York
Law School professor Beth Noveck floated the idea on her blog last July, inspiring an article in Wired
News. That, in turn, attracted the attention of IBM, which got behind the idea.").
241. Press Release, New York Law School, Patent Applications from Microsoft, IBM and Intel
Now Open for Public Review (July 9, 2007), http://www.nyls.edu/pages/5710.asp. The USPTO in-
cluded working with the peer review consortium in the first objective entitled "provide high quality
examination of patent applications" of their Strategic Plan. USPTO, 2007-2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 3
(2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2OO7-2012.pdf; see also Press Re-
lease, USPTO, USPTO to Test Impact of Public Input on Improving Patent Quality in the Computer
Technologies (June 7, 2007), http://www.uspto. gov/web/offices/com/speeches/07-21.htm (explaining
"USPTO supports expanding the ability of third parties to submit to the USPTO information they
believe is pertinent to a pending application, a concept included in patent modernization legislation now
under consideration in the U.S. Congress. In combination, the peer review pilot, applicant quality
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because they are chronically understaffed, lack robust searching systems (at
least for non-patent prior art), 242 and are exposed to ever-changing techni-
cal fields. 243 But good search systems exist, as do people knowledgeable in
technical areas. The open collaboration project proposes using the "wisdom
of the crowd" 244 by tapping into the public's knowledge of and access to
prior art to help patent examiners find and hone in on material art. The
project is not intended to replace patent examiners. 245
Using open collaboration, we can make it easier for the public to help
patent examiners find and appreciate prior art. Public knowledge can be-
come a resource that patent examiners can access, and not in a way that
will overwhelm the patent examiner with extraneous information. In other
words, "[t]he public can help-not disadvantage-the patent examin-
ers."
246
How would this work? An internet-based system, similar to online en-
cyclopedia Wikipedia®,247 will allow interested third parties or "peers" to
identify and provide commentaries on prior art related to published patent
applications of willing patent applicant participants. 248 The internet system
will automatically rate the prior art references identified and will submit
only the top-rated art to patent examiners along with the reviewers' com-
mentaries. A pilot program already is underway as of June 15, 2007, where
submissions and expanded third party submissions encourage a highly participatory examination proc-
ess that will lead to more efficient and effective review of patent applications.").
242. Hricik, supra note 12, at 224-25 ("Though charged with determining whether a claimed
invention is distinct from the entire body of prior public knowledge and uses, patent examiners have
almost no investigatory powers-no labs, no independent scientists, and have almost no way to compel
disclosure of information from applicant. In addition, while examiners have computerized, searchable
access to millions of U.S. patents, they do not have the same ease of access to non-patent-based infor-
mation.").
243. See Manny W. Schecter, Open Collaboration is Medicine for Our Ailing Patent System, 72
BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 682 (2006), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/ commu-
nitypatent/BNA-l0-20-06.html ("Patentable subject matter has also expanded into areas for which prior
art is not as accessible to patent examiners.").
244. Proponents Tout Plan for Web-Based Peer Review of Prior Art for Patent Searches, 72 BNA
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 534 (2006) (quoting Beth Simone Noveck discussing the Jeffer-
son-based idea that expertise is decentralized).
245. Schecter, supra note 243 (discussing project concerns and solutions).
246. Id.
247. See Varchaver, supra note 240. But see Cairns Blog, http://caims.typepad.com/blog/ (Aug. 29,
2006). The creator of the Community Patent Review Project, Beth Noveck, distinguishes that while a
wiki is an online collaborative editing tool, no editing of patent applications will take place in the
Project. Instead, Noveck analogizes the Project to Wikipedia only to convey "the appropriate sense of
openness, transparency and collaboration." Id. But Noveck emphasizes that the Community Patent
Review only uses a software system for open peer review.
248. The patent applicant's participation in this peer-review system is purely voluntary. See Propo-
nents Tout Plan for Web-Based Peer Review of Prior Art for Patent Searches, supra note 244.
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willing project participants allow third parties to evaluate their published
patent applications and submit prior art and commentaries. 249
There are, of course, concerns. 250 Will third parties subvert the oppor-
tunity to comment on their competitors' inventions for their own benefit?
Will the patent examination process be even further delayed because exam-
iners will spend too much time considering third party entries? Will patent
applicants be charged with inequitable conduct if they do not forward peer-
identified references to the USPTO? Because this project is in its infancy,
there are a myriad of questions. However, this is a clever approach to the
problem of prior art disclosure. The fact that it has support from the
USPTO, academia, and major companies 251 highlights the general recogni-
tion of the need to resuscitate the U.S. prior art disclosure system, 252 and
the appreciation of a novel system that melds public interest with innova-
tive technology.
CONCLUSION
U.S. patent applicants must be able to disclose prior art to the USPTO
free from the shackles of "threshold limits" of references, and without fear
of inequitable conduct allegations. The USPTO's new proposed IDS Rules
will only add time and expense to an already lengthy and expensive proc-
249. See USPTO, Pilot Concerning Public Submission of Peer Reviewed Prior Art, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE (PATENTS), June 26, 2007, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/sol/og/2007/week26/patsuba.htm; The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent
Review, The Peer-to-Patent Website is Now Live!, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/about.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007) (commenting on the June 15, 2007 launch, and how 250 pending patent
applications in Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security are open for public com-
mentary per the Peer-to-Patent procedures); see also The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent
Review, Updated Analytics 7.17.07, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent.org/peertopatent-status
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007) (reporting that in the first month of the pilot, 1078 people signed up to be
reviewers and have posted thirty-two instances of prior art for seven applications).
250. See Schecter, supra note 243 (discussing Project concerns and solutions).
251. Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Red Hat, Intel, GE, and Oracle are just some of the companies
that have already pledged support. Schecter, supra note 243.
252. Congress also recognizes the value of third party submissions, albeit not necessarily an open
source system. See section 7, entitled "Submissions by Third Parties and Other Quality Enhancements,"
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 7 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan.
24, 2008) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. by adding new § 122(e) entitled "Preissuance Submissions by
Third Parties."); see also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, S.
REP. NO. 110-259, at 24 (2008) ("After an application is published, members of the public-most likely,
a competitor or someone else familiar with the patented invention's field-may realize they have
information relevant to a pending application. The relevant information may include prior art that would
prohibit the pending application from issuing as a patent. Current USPTO rules permit the submission
of such prior art by third parties only if it is in the form of a patent or publication, and the submitter is
precluded from explaining why the prior art was submitted or what its relevancy to the application
might be. Such restrictions decrease the value of the information to the examiner and may, as a result,
deter such submissions.").
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ess, and ultimately will lead to poorer quality patents because applicants
may choose to "meet" the threshold limit at the expense of disclosing rele-
vant prior art.
The USPTO's proposed Rules also will also create a new playground
for patent infringers, who will have a field day finding mistakes in appli-
cants' relevancy statements and will search foreign patent file wrappers for
any prior art not disclosed in U.S. counterpart applications. The danger of
potential allegations of inequitable conduct from infringers may be so great
that ultimately patent applicants may adopt an ostrich-like approach to IDS
disclosures-they will not conduct any patentability searches so that they
do not learn of any references. Although applicants will submit fewer IDS
references, they will submit more patent applications because they will not
have searched for blocking prior art themselves. This will also lead to
poorer quality patents, since patent examiners will have to conduct all
searches themselves for more applications.
Perhaps U.S. patent examiners are overburdened, but solutions other
than the USPTO's proposed IDS Rules exist to fix this problem. If the pat-
ent infringement defense of inequitable conduct were abolished as pro-
posed under the Patent Reform Act of 2005, patent applicants likely would
have no reason to submit masses of references, since they would no longer
fear being accused of hiding references.
Increasing patent examiners' salaries and restructuring their jobs
based on the European model would likely have positive results, as would
fining patent applicants who file "frivolous" prior art or charging extra fees
for lengthy or numerous prior art references.
Finally, the Community Patent Review project is one of the most in-
novative approaches to "fixing" the search and examination problems the
USPTO faces. In a wiki-like system, the public at large could read patent
applications and submit references they believe are relevant for the patent
examiner's review. The patent examiner would receive the top ten rated
references based on the number of times the public cites such references. In
this way, the public's expertise in technical and scientific fields could be
harnessed to promote a more focused and relevant search by patent exam-
iners. This ultimately could lead to a more efficient search and examination
process and improved patent quality, which is, after all, the USPTO's "vi-
sion." 253
253. USPTO,supra note 31.
20081
